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Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome:
Sovereignty ad Absurdum and the
South China Sea Arbitration
Christopher R. Rossit
The South China Sea is the fifth largest body of water in the world. It
accounts for five trillion dollars in annual commercial activity involving a
third of maritime traffic worldwide. China claims wide-ranging sovereign
rights over upwards of ninety percent of this Sea via a controversial Ushaped line. Its claim upsets regional stability and portends a coming conflict with the United States, the world's supreme maritime power, over the
application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). China claims its sovereign authority predates UNCLOS by millennia; critics date China's claim to 1947. Already described as the most
important ruling in the modem history of the international law of the sea,
a Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration handed down a sweeping
rebuke of China's contentions in the July 2016 Award in the South China
Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), setting up a confrontation between
emergent China and established United States. This Article discusses that
Award in light of the fundamental tension within the liberal model of freedom of the seas-the unreconciled tension involving ownership interests
over resources of the sea (dominium) and the decision-making power to
rule over the seas (imperium). While scholarly attention dissects the Tribunal's discussion of historical and factual circumstances (effectivit~s) that
aggregate against China's sovereignty claims, this Article notes deeper
problems, too: Ambiguities in UNCLOS have allowed powerful states to historically territorialize wide swaths of the dwindling global commons, all
within the compliant liberal framework. Such claims are reminiscent of the
Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), where Spain and Portugal divided up ownership of the world. The territorializing instinct of the Treaty of Tordesillas
serves as a syndromic indicator of a recurring problem involving the sea
and its increasingly scarce resources. It sets up a major challenge for international law as between superpower interests in the South China Sea, and,
more generally, over disputes involving the global commons and spatial
regimes on the emerging frontier of technological capability.
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Introduction
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines served notice to China that it
would initiate compulsory arbitral proceedings before the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) under Article 287 and Annex VII of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)' to resolve a dispute
with China over maritime entitlements in the South China Sea.2 The Philippines alleged China improperly claimed underlying seabed extending
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Part XV of UNCLOS provides for two means of dispute
settlement, consensual means (such as conciliation, negotiation, and diplomacy) and
compulsory settlement. Four kinds of compulsory dispute settlement are allowed under
Article 287: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of
Justice, arbitration in accordance with UNCLOS Annex VII, or creation of a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with UNCLOS Annex VIII. Where parties cannot agree on a
compulsory form of settlement, Annex VII arbitrations prevail.
2. Notification and Statement of Claim at 22, In re South China Sea Arbitration
(Republic of the Phil. v. People's Republic of China), PCA Case Repository 2013-19
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/uploads/pdfs/embassy/
2013/2013-0122-Notification% 2 0and%20Statement%20of%2OClaim%20on%2OWest%20Philippine%2OSea.pdf
[hereinafter Notification South China Sea Arbitration] [https://perma.cc/MUS5-HYMP].
The controversy commonly is framed in terms of the South China Sea, although it is
important to note that it is known as the East Sea in Vietnam and the West Philippine
Sea in the Philippines. The main features of the South China Sea are: the Paracel Islands
in the northeast (disputed by China/Taiwan and Vietnam); the Pratas Islands, a coral
reef eleven miles wide (administered by Taiwan but claimed by China); Scarborough
Reef (contested by China/Taiwan and the Philippines); the Spratly Islands, off the coasts
of the Philippines, Malaysia and southern Vietnam (claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China/Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam); and the Natuan Islands in
the south-western South China Sea. See Clive Schofield, Adrift on Complex Waters: Geographical, Geopolitical and Legal Dimensions to the South China Sea Disputes, in THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DispuTE: POLITICAL, LEGAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 24,
25-26 (Leszek Buszynski & Christopher B. Roberts eds., 2015) [hereinafter The South
China Sea Maritime Dispute].
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almost nine hundred nautical miles from the nearest Chinese coast 3 -to
within fifty nautical miles of the Philippine islands of Luzon and Palawan 4 -thereby encroaching on the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) and continental shelf. It petitioned the Tribunal to sustain the appli-5
cability of UNCLOS, which both China and the Philippines had ratified,
and to determine that the Spratly Islands were rocks, low tide elevations,7
6
submerged reefs, or banks -but not actually islands, as China claimed.
Numerous hydrographic reports indicate that the Spratlys neither form a
natural or physical unit, nor conform to an accepted definition.8 The
Spratlys consist of one hundred islets, atolls, calderas, shoals, and coral
reefs-idiomatically referred to as "features"-scattered over an area covering 410,000 square kilometers (158,000 square miles); at high tide, no
more than five square kilometers remain dry. 9 Rock outcroppings incapable of sustaining economic life or human habitation, according to
3. See Notification South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 2, ' 1 (challenging
China's claims to areas of the South China Sea vis-i-vis the Philippines as far as 870
nautical miles from the nearest Chinese coast).
4. See id. ' 2. Portions of the Chinese claim came within thirty-nine miles of Luzon
and thirty-four miles of Palawan. See Final Transcript Day 1-Merits Hearing at 57-58,
In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1547 (testimony of Professor Oxman)
[https://perma.cc/D8DG-9D7H].
5. See Yu Mincai, China's Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the South China
Sea Dispute: Legal Effects and Policy Options, 45 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 2 (2014) (noting that China ratified UNCLOS in 1996, and the Philippines ratified it in 1984).
6. Of principal concern to the Philippines was determination of the status of nine
maritime features: Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef,
Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef
and Fiery Cross Reef. See In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 201319, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, c1169 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter
South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility)].
7. See In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19, Award, '11
279-648 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration (Award)]. Lowtide elevations are submerged (non-visible) rocks and reefs. They generate no maritime
entitlement under UNCLOS, meaning they are not entitled to any territorial sea or EEZ.
See UNCLOS art. 13. Before being modified by Chinese construction projects, Mischief
Reef, Keenan Reef, Gaven Reef, and Subi Reef were completely submerged low-tide elevations before modified by Chinese construction projects. See Hung Pham, Philippines v.
China: The South China Sea Finally Meets International Law, 16 CH.-KENTr J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 1, 7 (2016). UNCLOS arts. 60(8) and 80 preclude artificial islands from
attaining territorial seas of their own or acquiring the status of an island.
8. Melissa H. Loja, The Spratly Islands as a Single Unit Under International Law: A
Commentary on the Final Award in Philippines/ChinaArbitration, 47 OcEAN DEv. & Imr'L
L. 309, 312 (2016) (reviewing hydrographic reports from Richard Spratly's reported
sighting in 1843 up to 2014).
9. See Spratly Islands, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
QL5G-YJZ2]. The Spratlys are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Portions
are claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines. Forty-five islands are occupied by a small
number of military forces from China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
Brunei claims a continental shelf overlapping a southern reef [Louisa Reef] but has not
made a formal claim to the reef; Brunei also claims an EEZ over the area. There are no
indigenous inhabitants, but there are four airports and three heliports. Id.
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UNCLOS, generate a small territorial sea (twelve nautical miles). 10
Islands, however, carry much greater weight. They generate two hundred
nautical mile EEZs 1 1 and additional rights relating to the subjacent continental shelves,' 2 which possibly can be extended. 13 Indeed, Vietnam and
Malaysia's joint submission claiming extensions to the outer limits of their
respective continental shelves triggered the dramatic escalation in events
resulting in this arbitration.' 4 China claimed expansive maritime rights
over these features, 15 and the living and non-living resources of their pur10. See UNCLOS, art. 2. UNCLOS art. 121(3) provides: "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no [EEZ] or continental
shelf." For a discussion of this article, see Alex G. Oude Elferink, Clarifying Article
121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Limits Set by the Nature of InternationalLegal
Processes, IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 58-68 (1998). Other major island and reef formations in the South China Sea include the Paracel Islands, Prats, the Natuna Islands
and Scarbourough Shoal. For a helpful map of the geography of the South China Sea
and disputed maritime claims, see South China Sea: Conflicting Claims and Tensions,
Lowy INST. INT'L POL'Y (2016), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea
[https://perma.cc/ZC3-EYSP].
11. UNCLOS art. 121(1), Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (mirroring art. 10 of the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and defining an island
as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide). UNCLOS art. 121(2) attaches to islands the legal characteristics assimilated to
other land territory, including the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the
continental shelf.
12. See id. at 121(2). For discussion of the Tribunal's treatment of the insular features of the South China Sea, see generally Nilufer Oral, Symposium on the South China
Sea: "Rocks" or "Islands"? Sailing Towards Legal Clarity in the Turbulent South China Sea,
110 AJIL UNBOUND 279-84 (2016).
13. See Submissions, through the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph8, of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, UNTED NATIONS:
OCEANS & L. SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs new/commissionsubmissions
.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2016) (listing submissions to the U.N Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf for continental shelf extensions beyond two hundred
nautical miles from any baselines) [https://perma.cc/C2ZE-DXCX]; see also UNCLOS
art. 76 (defining the outer limit of the continental shelf and definitions where the outer
edge of the continental margin extends beyond two hundred nautical miles). China's
presentation of its claim to almost the entire South China Sea, in the form of the Ushaped line, was made in immediate response to Malaysia and Vietnam, which "jointly
lodged a submission to the U.N.'s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,"
purporting to claim rights to extended continental shelves in the South China Sea. Yang
Fang, The South China Sea Disputes: Whither a Solution?, in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INTHE
SOUTH CHINA SEA: NAVIGATING ROUGH WATERS 164, 165 (Jing Huang & Andrew Billo
eds., 2015).
14. See Wu SHICUN, SOLVING DISPUTES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 166 (2013) (calling the joint submission
by Malaysia and Vietnam the "turning point for a new round of escalation"); Guifang
Uulia) Xue, The South China Sea: Competing Claims and Conflict Situations, in THE LIMITS
OF MARITIME JURISDICTION 225, 231 (Clive Scholfield et al. eds., 2014) (noting the joint
submissions added "an extra dimension ... [escalating the] situation.").
15. See Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of China to the U.N. to the U.N.
Secretary-General (May 7, 2009), http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs-new/submissionsfiles/mysvnm33_09/chn 2009re_mysvnm e.pdf ("China has indisputable sovereignty
over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign
rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil
thereof.") [https://perma.cc/VEA3-BVGM].
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ported continental shelves and EEZs. 1 6 In asserting its claim, China prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in their artisanal craft off
Scarborough Shoal (outside the Spratlys), 17 and constructed an artificial
island, with installations and structures, within the Philippines' two hun20
19
dred nautical-mile EEZ' 8 on Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, and Subi Reef,
China's actions also interrupted the Philippines' oil exploration off the
coast of Palawan (including Reed Bank). 2 1 Most problematically, China
asserted historic sovereignty rights over eighty to ninety percent of the
16. See Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea:
History, Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 98, 123-24 (2013) (summarizing
the Chinese view as being claims to sovereignty over the islands and sovereign rights
over the waters and seabed and subsoil adjacent to those islands, while preserving Chinese historic rights in fishing, navigation and other marine activity (such as oil and gas
development)). See also Hong Nong, Interpretingthe U-Shape Line in the South China Sea,
CHINA-US Focus (May 15, 2012), http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/interpreting-the-u-shape-line-in-the-south-china-sea/, (defining China's historic rights as
"fishing rights, navigation rights and priority rights of resource development") [https://
perma.cc/6ETH-JSNV].
17. See Final Transcript Day 2-Merits Hearing at 156-58, 181-85, In re South
China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www
.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1548 [https://perma.cc/6F23-529A]; Final Transcript
Day 1-Merits Hearing at 9, In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository
2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1547
[https://perma.cc/7GSZ-DXXD].
18. Final Transcript Day 1-Merits Hearing at 9, In re South China Sea Arbitration,
PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/1547 [https://perma.cc/7GSZ-DXXD].
19. The Chinese have added over six hundred acres to Fiery Cross Reef, which now
contains a three thousand meter runway capable of accommodating military planes. See
Hannah Beech, What's New on China's Artificial Islands in the South China Sea? Basketball Courts, TIME (May 22, 2016), http://time.com/43415 10/south-china-sea-artificialislands/ [https://perma.cc/FV54-QHXF]. Within the Spratly Islands archipelagowhich is contested in all or in parts by China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines
and Vietnam-China is building artificial islands on Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Subi
Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson South Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef. In another
grouping of islands in the South China Sea-the Paracel Islands (northwest of the Spratlys)-China has constructed another runway on Woody Island and an artificial harbor.
See Michael Pilger, ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the
South China Sea, and Implications for the United States, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV.
COMM'N, 8-9 (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
ADIZ%20Update_-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5WH-CMXN]. See also ParacelIslands, CIA
WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
pf.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/WZU8-8ZF5].
20. See Geoffrey Till, The Global Significance of the South China Sea Disputes, in THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA: A CRUCIBLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION OR CONFLICT - MAKING SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS? 13, 15 (C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy eds., 2016) [hereinafter THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA: A CRUCIBLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION] (discussing China's military

upgrades on Subi, Johnson South, and Fiery Cross Reefs, along with Taiwan's upgrades
(on Itu Aba), Malaysia's upgrades on Swallow Reef, and the Philippines' upgrades (on

Thitu)).
21. See Enrico Dela Cruz, Phillippines' Oil Still in Troubled Waters after South China
Sea Ruling, MANILA BULL. (July 22, 2016), http://www.mb.com.ph/philippines-oil-still-introubled-waters-after-south-china-sea-ruling/ (noting two stalled concessions in the Reed
Bank due to surveying interruptions caused by Chinese coastguard vessels) [https://per
ma.cc/LJ4Y-TVA8].
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entire South China Sea 22 - a body of water covering three and one-half million square kilometers. 23 Central to China's claim is a map, 24 which
presented a U-shaped nine-dash/dotted line2 5 stretching more than 1500
kilometers from its southernmost territory of Hainan Island to James Shoal
26
off the coast of Borneo (the southernmost point of the U-shaped line).
China did not nor has yet made explicit "through legislation, proclamation,
or other official statements the legal basis or nature of its claim," 2 7 noting,
in addition to "indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China
Sea and the adjacent waters," 28 its oblique enjoyment of sovereign rights
over "relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof."'29 If by
"adjacent waters" China intends to claim maritime zones connected to
insular island features, then the resolution of disputed sovereignty issues
would have provided a basis for settlement under UNCLOS, if island or
rock features had existed. But the conflation of "adjacent waters" with "rel22. See Notification South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 2, 3 2. See also Pham,
supra note 7, at 1 (noting that the nine-dash line accounts for eighty or ninety percent of
the South China Sea). China submitted two notes verbales to the Secretary-General in
2009 asserting historic rights to the South China Sea that extended far beyond maritime
entitlements under the Convention. The notes verbales appended a map detailing a ninedash line covering China's assertion of historic rights. See Note Verbale of the People's
Republic of China to the U.N. to the Secretary-General of the U.N. (May 7, 2009), http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs-new/submissions-files/mysvnm33_09/chn-2009re-mys_vnm e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4488-YP9B]; Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of
the People's Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations (May 7, 2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ccs-new/submissions_
files/vnm37_- 09/chn -2009revnm.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CCX-PTHP].
23. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, '13.
24. See id. ' 16.
25. The Tribunal referred to the line as a "nine-dash line" but did not acknowledge
any particular nomenclature as correct or authoritative. See South China Sea Arbitration
(Award), supra note 7,
169 n.131.
26. See BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA 56, 116
(2014) (discussing the U-shaped line stretching as far South as James Shoal). Hayton
noted Chinese government map makers simply transliterated "the names of the features
on... British maps into Chinese," and misconstrued the British maps being copied [for
instance James Shoal, which is under water, not an island]). Id. at 55. See also LiJinming & Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note, 34
OcEAN DEv. & ITr'L L. 287, 288 (2003) (noting the 1935 Map of Chinese Islands in the
South China Sea declared China's southernmost boundary should reach the 4' northern
latitude, including the James Shoal).
27. Kevin Baumert & Brian Melchior, China: Maritime Claims in the South China
Seas, LIMITS IN THE SEAS 1 (No. 143, Dec. 5, 2015) (Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States Department of State), https://www
.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJE9-NPBT].
28. Id.
29. Note Verbale of the People's Republic of China to the U.N. to the Secretary-General of the U.N. (May 7, 2009), http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs-new/submissions_
files/mysvnm33_09/chn -2009re_mysvnm e.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK7Z-L22N]; Note
Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (May 7, 2009), http://www.un
.org/Depts/los/clcs new/submissions files/vnm37_09/chn 2009revnm.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LK7Z-L22N].
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evant waters" opens up an array of expansive interpretations, 30 which is
compounded both by China's non-differentiation between insular features
that qualify as islands within the meaning of UNCLOS, and by those qualifying as something less substantial (such as rocks, shoals, reefs, or
banks). 3 1 The vagueness of the claim, along with seemingly interchangeable references to "historic rights," "historic title," and "historic waters,"
raises the prospect that China seeks political advantage through intentional
use of unclear terminology. 3 2 An ambiguous "wait and see" negotiating
posture accompanied China's law of the sea negotiations between 1973
and 1982. 33 Similarly, a complaint of "deliberate ambiguity" now attaches
to China's historic claim over the South China Sea. 3 4 Other analysts note
China's "strategy of incremental action, '3 5 or "salami-slicing," 3 6 which
allows China to consolidate gains, deter others from doing the same, and
trivialize objections to its non-conforming behavior "under the reasonable
assumption that it will be unthinkable for the United States to threaten
major-power war over a trivial incident in a distant sea." 37 This ambiguity
stimulates concern that China is amassing maritime strength while laying
historical markers to include the South China Sea as a future "core interest," "wording usually reserved for the non-negotiability of Taiwan, Tibet,
''38
and Xinjiang.
China's unformed language may also indicate it is in no hurry to

define terms from the lexicon of western international law, given the latter's history with regard to the law of the sea. 39 Indeed, the western legal
tradition never inherited a uniform interpretation of sovereignty from
30. See Stein Tonnesson, China's National Interests and the Law of the Sea: Are they
Reconcilable?, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE: THE PROSPECT
OF AJOINT DEVELOPMENT REGIME 199, 216 (Wu Shicun & Nong Hong eds., 2014).
31. Florian Dupuy & Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights
Claim in the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 127-28 (noting "China does not
distinguish between insular features that qualify as "islands: within the meaning of
UNCLOS . .. and those qualifying as 'rocks' . . . ").
32. See id. at 124, 128 (questioning whether the vagueness of China's South Sea
claim forms part of a political strategy and noting China's usages of changing terminology relating to historic rights, title, and waters).
33. THANH-DAM TRUONG & KARIM KNo, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASIAN REGIONALiSM: A CRITICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE 64 (2016) (referencing China's negotiating posture
during UNCLOS III discussions).
34. Robert Beckman, 'DeliberateAmbiguity' and the Demise of China's Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea, 1 ASIA-PACIFC J. OCEAN L. & POL. 164-82 (2016).
35. Ronald O'Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, in MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING
CHINA 1, 15 (Yuan Sun ed., 2013).
36. Id. at 13 (quoting Robert Haddick).
37. Id. at 17.
38. Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu & Ted L. McDorman, Post-2009: An Overview of Recent
Developments Concerning the South China Sea, in MARITIME ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA: TROUBLED WATERS OR A SEA OF OPPORTUNITY 155, 160 (Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu & Ted L.
McDorman eds., 2013); Brendan Taylor, The South China Sea as a 'Crisis', in THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTE, supra note 2, at 172, 175 (noting Chinese officials have yet
to publicly refer to the South China Sea in 'core' terms usually referencing Taiwan, Tibet
or Xinjiang).
39. See id.
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Roman law. 40 Instead, early modem thought twinned imprecise usages of
dominium (ownership) and imperium (rule) into what would transmute
over centuries into a public law concept of state sovereignty. 4 1 The gradual
incorporation of these loose usages ambivalently affected the modern law
of the sea. 4 2 This law has imperfectly accommodated increasing claims of
coastal state jurisdiction over areas formerly beyond the scope of national
jurisdiction within a regime that has attempted to decouple the rights of
ownership from the power of rule.
Before Jean Bodin classically defined sovereignty as "the absolute and
perpetual power of the state," 4 3 the cognate resembled an ensemble of
expressions signifying control, ownership, and imperative. Its power-conferring qualities spread across a feudal arc of status-holders, as indicated
by a variety of terms: sovereign, seigneur, suzerain, sire, sir, sieur, monsieur,
monseigneur.44 Sovereignty's linguistic pre-history blended together a private law concept of ownership with the prerogative power of the king as
dominus -where the king "was not merely the ruler over his realm" but also
the undifferentiated owner of the realm. 45 Proprietas,or private property,
granted subjects a status, too.4 6 This status involved not only title to, but
control over, the usufruct, allowing subjects the right to alienate property
vis-a-vis the king over limited internal matters as pertaining to the household: "For a man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum
refugium [and each man's home is his safest refugel." 4 7 The extensive
rights of the paterfamiliaswithin this limited realm of Roman family law
extended 4 8 into medieval Europe and recast the king's exercise of dominium to mean a right of dominium over the whole realm, but not necessarily
all of its internal parts. 49 This "internal" de-linking contrasted with matters beyond the physical sphere (and later the borders) of the imperium,
where the spatial prerogative powers of the king as dominus remained
40. Daniel Lee, Sources of Sovereignty: Roman Imperium and Dominium in Civilian
Theories of Sovereignty, 2 POLrnCA ANTICA 79, 80 (2012).
41. See generally JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995) (discussing
sovereignty's the broad temporal framework); Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as
Dominium: Is There a Right to HumanitarianIntervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 21 (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) (discussing sovereignty's conceptual derailment in the early modem age); Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History, 16
ALTERNATIVES 425 (1991) (tying sovereignty to the career of modernity between 1600
and 1800).
42. BARTELSON, supra note 41, at 28-30.
43. SeeJEAN BODIN, Six LIVRES DE LA R]PUBLIQUE 122 (1576) ("la puissance absolue &
perpetuelle d'une Republique") (modernized from the old French).
44. KURT BURCH, "PROPERTY" AND THE MAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 143
(1988).
45. See id. at 89.
46. Id. at 144-45.
47.

SIR EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1628); R. v. Stevens

(2011), (2011) 106 O.R. 3d (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
48.

See GEORGE MousouRAKis, ROMAN LAW AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL LAW TRADI-

TION 103 (2015) (discussing the power of the paterfamilias).
49. See id. at 90.
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supreme. 50 This concept of external sovereignty developed over centuries
5
and remodeled the idea of the dominus through custom and convention. '
But the development of external sovereignty took centuries to create; its
appearance was not as sudden as the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the socalled birth of the state system, makes it out to be. 5 2 The decoupling of
sovereignty's medieval portmanteau-like components of dominium and
imperium5 3 has never been complete, especially in the law of the sea. This
imperfect de-linking has created uneasy tensions involving the ownership
of the oceans' living and mineral resources, the security interests of coastal
states and maritime powers, the fate of the dwindling global commons, and
the international legal authority meant to balance disparate and historical
private law influences of dominium within the rule-oriented regime structure of UNCLOS.
Perhaps Chinese national identity politics project a more ambitious
notion of the nation state than is described by Westphalian sovereignty-a
version that embraces prospective and retrospective temporal frameworks
constituting a "civilizational state."'5 4 This notion adheres to its own
intrinsic logic and advances a set of distinct "Asian Values" while mindful
of a "Century of Humiliation" caused by western imperial interference and
unequal treaties.5 5 If China thinks time is on its side, it may be seeking to
re-establish tributary relationships which would substitute the authoritarian Chinese political regime for the mythologized folklore of China as the
Middle Kingdom-the center of the East and South Asian universe. 56 The
prospect of a Sinocentric Age of Empire arises, 5 7 akin to that created by
nineteenth century European probes to "find the peripheries" of ideological and economic domination in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.5 8 Finding
the peripheries of China's land empire-given its historical self-identification as a dynastic land power-has been a major historical and twentieth
century preoccupation. 59 But at the Eighteenth Party Congress in Novem50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 90.
52. See, e.g., James Caporaso, Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public
Authority, and Sovereignty, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER 1, 2,
10 (2000) (featuring discussions on the "Westphalian Moment" and the modern system
of territorially organized states).
53. See id. (referencing Stephen Lahey).
54.

See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN

WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 245, 251-52 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing
China as a civilization-state as opposed to a nation-state).
55. TRUONG & KNIo, supra note 33, at 4-5, 12.
56. See JACQUES, supra note 54, at 303-04 (discussing Middle Kingdom mentality);
see generally Mohan Malik, Historical Fiction: China's South China Sea Claims, WORLD
AFF. (May-June 2013), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/historical-fictionchina%E2%80%99s-south-china-sea-claims [https://perma.cc/EZ8D-MBJD].
57. The term is borrowed from Eric Hobsbawm's THE AGE OF EMPIRE: 1875-1914
(1987), which details the period of European worldwide colonial expansion. See E.J.
HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE: 1875-1914 9-10 (1987).
58. See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 3, 5, 6 (1999).
59. See TRUONG & KNIO, supra note 33, at 62 (noting China's awareness of the significance of its maritime borders arose only in relation to the formation of China as a
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ber 2012, President Hu Jintao called for China to attach great importance
to maritime security. 60 Finding the peripheries of China's maritime
61
empire in the South China Sea claim now prompts attempts by scholars
and the United States State Department to connect the dots or dashes to
62
decrypt exactly what China's U-shaped broken line means.
Some Chinese scholars argue that the broken line represents sovereignty claims over the features of the South China Sea. 6 3 Another group of
scholars attaches historic rights significance to the line, conferring exclusive rights to economically exploit, explore, and conserve the resources of
the water and construct and install artificial islands over the waters. 64 Yet
others indicate that the line circumscribes historic waters or China's traditional maritime boundary, notwithstanding its broken or non-continuous
configuration. 6 5 But Wu Shicun, the president of China's National Institute for South China Seas Studies, signaled that China's core design represents an amalgam of "sovereignty + UNCLOS + historic rights." 66 He
indicated that the U-shaped line projected Chinese sovereignty over the features within the line, sovereign rights over water as defined by UNCLOS,
and historic rights regarding fishing, navigation, and resource development. 67 However, he noted that "the debate will continue if China remains
modem state);

GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER: INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY

13-15 (1998) (discussing China's post-war preoccupation with its land frontiers, including the distraction of Taiwan after 1949, concern
FORCE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

over its southern frontier during the Korean War, and border wars with India and the
USSR).
60. Full text of HuJintao'sReport at 18th Party Congress, XINHuANET (Nov. 17, 2012
11:45 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/
c_131981259_10.htm [https://perma.cc/MLB4-SE9P].
61. See, e.g., Chris P.C. Chung, Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China's Claim in the
South China Sea, 1946-1974, 42 MOD. CHINA 38, 39 (2015); Keyuan Zou, China's UShaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited, 43 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 18, 21 (2012)
(calling the U-shaped line a legal conundrum); Keyuan Zou, The Chinese TraditionalMaritime Boundary Line in the South ChinaSea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of
the Dispute over the Spratly Islands, 14 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 27, 32-33, 49
(1999) (showing the historical development of China's U-Shaped line from its first
appearance in 1914 to Beijing's official acknowledgement of the line in 1948).
62. See Baumert & Melchior, supra note 27, at 11 (posting three different interpretations of the dashed-line claim).
63. See Chung, supra note 61, at 39-43 (agreeing with this position based on "virtually unused" government documents, declassified in 2008-09, and housed in Taipei).
64. See id. at 39 (citing Fu, Huang, Wu, Gao, and Jia).
65. See Sienho Yee, Editorial Comment, The South China Sea Arbitration Decisions on
Jurisdictionand Rule of Law Concerns, 15 CHINESE J.INT'L L. 219, 233 (2016) (noting the
dotted line has been displayed as a national boundary line); Wu, supra note 14, at 80
(noting Chinese scholarly categories of interpretation for the line).
66. See Zou Keyuan & Liu Xinchang, The U-Shaped Line and Historic Rights in the
Philippines v. China Arbitration Case, in ARBITRATION CONCERNING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
PHILIPPINES VERSUS CHINA 127, 132 (Wu Shicun & Zou Keyuan eds., 2016) (quoting Wu
Shicun).
67. Id. See also Bill Hayton, China's 'HistoricRights' in the South China Sea: Made in
America?, THE DIPLOMAT Uune 21, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/chinas-historic-rights-in-the-south-china-sea-made-in-america/
(summarizing the view of Wu
Shicun) [https://perma.cc/RH7V-KGF2].
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silent and keeps its claim ambiguous." 68
China claimed that "the dotted line came into existence much earlier
than" UNCLOS, 69 and that its historic rights were independent of the Convention but protected by it.7 0 China also accused other littoral states of
encroaching on its historic title. 7 1 Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS require
that, with respect to the EEZ and the continental shelf, boundary delimitation "shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law" to
achieve an "equitable solution. ' 7 2 But China's flat-out assertion of entitlement prompted diplomatic protests from Indonesia, 73 Malaysia, 7 4 the Philippines, 7 5 and Vietnam, 76 and boundary protests from claimants such as
Indonesia, 7 7 Taiwan, 78 and Brunei, 79 and threats by China against med68. Wu, SOLVING DispuTEs, supra note 14, at 83.
69. Remarks by Mr. Xu Hong, Director-Generalof the Departmentof Treaty and Law of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Position Paper of the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdictionin the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated
by the Republic of the Philippines, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA (Dec. 7, 2014), http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfaeng/zxxx-662805/tl217150.shtml
[https://perma.cc/T6YSLB57].
70. Supplemental Documents of the Philippines Vol. I at Annex 649, In re South
China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://
pcacases.com/web/view/7 ("China's sovereignty and relevant rights in the South China
Sea, formed in the long historical course, are upheld by successive Chinese governments, reaffirmed by Chinese laws on many occasions, and protected under international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea False")
[https://perma.cc/4Q7G-F6FKI.
71. See Zou, supra note 61, at 21-23 (noting that China asserted encroachments by
Vietnam (1170 square kilometers), the Philippines (620,000 square kilometers), Malaysia (170,000 square kilometers), Brunei (50,000 square kilometers), and Indonesia
(35,000 square kilometers)).
72. UNCLOS art. 73.
73. Memorial of the Philippines Vol. VI at Annex 197, In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/
view/7 (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the
United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Jul. 8, 2010)) [https://
perma.cc/4Q7G-F6FKI.
74. Memorial of the Philippines Vol. VI at Annex 194, In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/
view/7 (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (May 20, 2009)) [https://perma.cc/4Q7GF6FK].
75. Memorial of the Philippines Vol. VI at Annex 200, In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/
view/7 (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to
the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Apr. 5, 2011))
[https://perma.cc/4Q7G-F6FKI.
76. Memorial of the Philippines Vol. VI at Annex 193, In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/
view/7 (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to
the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (May 8, 2009))
[https://perma.cc/4Q7G-F6FK].
77. See Yenni Kwok, Indonesian PresidentJokowi Visits the Natuna Islands to Send a
Strong Signal to China, TIME (June 23, 2016), http://time.com/4379401/indonesia-chinajokowi-natuna-sovereignty-maritime-fishing-dispute/ (regarding Jakarta's objection to
Beijing's nine-dash line, which overlaps with Indonesian sovereignty claims over the
Natuna Islands) [https://perma.cc/3FFQ-8UZ].
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dling by non-claimants such as Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. 80
81
China's sovereignty designs over this sea-Asia's so-called cauldron, or
82
crucible of conflict -portend ominous consequences in the fast-emerging
83
strategic rivalry with the reigning maritime power, the United States.
New realities in Southeast Asia contrast an emerging China with a
retrenching United States, prompting concerns as old as the Peloponnesian
War (431-404 B.C.E.) about an inevitable confrontation between rising
and receding powers, 8 4 this time "in the new world of the South China

78. Jiye Kim, Where Does Taiwan Stand on the South China Sea?, NAT'L INT. (May 7,
2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/where-does-taiwan-stand-the-southchina-sea-16099 (China's One-China policy systematically excludes Taiwan from trackone security dialogue processes in the Asia-Pacific, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum) [https://perma.cc/PNS5-DAE4]; see Yannhuie Song, The South ChinaSea Workshop Process and Taiwan's Participation,in MARITIME
ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 70, 77-78 (Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, Ted L. McDorman eds.,
2013) (noting that China's One-China policy systematically excludes Taiwan from track
one security dialogue processes in the Asia-Pacific, including the ASEAN Regional
Forum); Yann-huie Song, Taiwan's Response to the Philippines-PRCSouth China Sea Arbitration, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (July 15, 2015), https://amti.csis.org/
(noting that
taiwans-response-to-the-philippines-prc-south-china-sea-arbitration/
although this exclusion has muffled Taiwan's voice in international forums, it has persistently voiced opposition to any solution to the South China Sea dispute arrived at
without its participation, particularly involving Itu Aba [Taiping Island], which it
claimed in 1946 and has garrisoned troops there since 1956) [https://perma.cc/8M24ZDAT].
79. See Brunei Maintains a Low Profile in PressingIts South China Sea Claims, WORLD
POL. REV. (Jan.28, 2016), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/17799/bru(discussing Brunei's
nei-maintains-a-low-profile-in-pressing-its-south-china-sea-claims
discreet opposition to China's South China Sea claims and Brunei's overlapping claims
to Louisa Reef, Owen Shoal, and Rifleman Bank (including Bombay Castle) based on
Brunei's 1984 signing of UNCLOS) [https://perma.cc/R5KJ-KSDUI.
80. See Gavin Fernando, China Slams New Zealand, Japan Over South China Sea
Involvement, NEws.CoM.Au (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/world-economy/china-slams-new-zealand-japan-over-south-china-sea-involvement/
news-story/38274394862f990e40f3a72806633bb8 (reporting on China's warning to
New Zealand about complications of "outside involvement," and China's warning to
Japan that joint patrols or drills in these waters "is playing with fire") [https://perma.cc/
NB3L-NZSL]; see also Colin Clark, Chinese Threaten Japan, Australia Over South China
Sea; Time for US FON Ops?, BREAKING DEF., (Aug. 23, 2016), http://breakingdefense
.com/2016/08/chinese-threaten-j apan-australia-over-south-china-sea-time-for-us-fonops/ (noting China's Ambassador to Japan's admonishment that Japan would "cross a
red line" if it took part in freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and
Chinese government-owned press reports that Australian provocations in South China
Sea waters would provide "ideal targets") [https://perma.cc/Q3LM-7HSE].

81. See generally ROBERT D. KA.N', ASIA'S CAULDRON: THE SOUTH CHINA SA AND THE
END OF A STABLE PACIFIC (2014).
82. HAYTON, supra note 26, at xvi.
83. See, e.g., Hugh White, Would America Really Go to War Over the South China Sea?
NAT'L INT. (Sept. 2, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/would-americareally-go-war-over-the-south-china-sea-17570 (discussing classic questions of power
politics facing U.S. policy makers) [https://perma.cc/QBY7-2DGP]; Bonnie S. Glaser,
Conflict in the South China Sea, COUNCIL ON FOR. REL. (Oct. 2016), https://www.cfr.org/
report/conflict-south-china-sea (noting tensions in the South China Sea are a potential
source of conflict) [https://perma.cc/4VDK-RGLP].
84. See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND THE FAL OF THE GREAT POwERs (1989)

(detailing trans-historical confrontations between land and sea powers); see also MarkJ.
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85

This Article revisits this contentious case based on China's emphasis
on historic rights to the South China Sea. Contested sovereignty claims
generate appeals to the historical record, where factual circumstances,
called effectivites, 8

6

buttress and counter narratives to establish better title

among disputants. 8 7 Rather than ending such disputes, effectivit~s often
fall prey to selective interpretation, making reliance on them, as the Tribunal noted in the Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, "voluminous in quantity
but .. . sparse in useful content."8 8 Maps do not necessarily establish
facts-"[they] merely constitute information," which of themselves "and by
virtue solely of their existence . . .cannot constitute a territorial title."8 9
The disconnection between China's historical account and the factual circumstances supporting historic title is startling. Chinese scholars claim
China's historic title spans millennia. 90 Opposing arguments in the case
dated it formally to May 7, 2009,91 based on a 1947 map drawn by the
Valencia, The South China Sea and the "Thucydides Trap", in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A
CRUCIBLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 59, 60 (C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy eds., 2016)
(discussing the prospect of war between emerging and established powers).
85. HAYTON, supra note 26, at 269.
86. See generallyCHARLES DE VISSCHER, LES EFFECTIVITtS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (A. Pedone ed., 1967); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 I.CJ. REP. 554,
586-87, ' 63 (Dec. 22) (defining effectivites as "the conduct of the administrative authorities as proof of the effective exercise of territorial jurisdiction in the region during the
colonial period").
87. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1986 L.CJ. REP. 554, 63 (discussing the purpose of effectivitts).
88. Eritrea v. Yemen, 22 R.I.A.A. 268, 1 239 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998).
89. Frontier Dispute, (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.CJ. RE'. 554, 54; see
also Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 31, at 135-36 (reviewing Chinese commentators'
emphasis on the ancientness of China's sovereignty over the South China Sea).
90. Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and ParacelIslands: A
Historicaland Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 399, 400 n. 4 and accompanying text (1991) (noting China's discovery and exploitation of South China Sea islands
for over two thousand years, beginning with the Han Dynasty); Brian K. Murphy, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and InternationalLaw, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J., 187,
200 (1994) (citing Chinese historians' claim that records of Chinese discovery of the
Spratlys date to as early as 206 B.C.E. during the Han Dynasty); LEE LAI To, CHINA AND
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DIALOGUES 9 (2009) (noting the People's Republic of China's sovereignty claims date back to the Han dynasty in 200 B.C.E.); Wu, SOLVING DISPUTES, supra
note 14, at 16 (noting consensus among Chinese scholars based on textual records and
archaeological findings that China first discovered the South China Sea islands); Peter A.
Dutton, An Analysis of China's Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea, in MAJOR
LAW AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

57, 59-62 (2014) (citing Harbin University of Technology professor Ge Yongping's
claim of Chinese sovereignty dating to the Han Dynasty, along with other Chinese scholars, including Li Mingjiang, Li Guoqiang, and Li Anmin); see also Government of the
People's Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines Pt. 11 (4) (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfaeng/
zxxx 662805/t1217147.shtml [hereinafter China's Position Paper] ("Chinese activities
in the South China Sea date back over 2000 years ago") [https://perma.cc/D4GP-B8YG].
91.

Final Transcript Day 1-Merits Hearing at 77, In re South China Sea Arbitration,

PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/1547 (First-round submissions by Mr. [Andrew B.] Loewenstein) ("[China]
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Nationalist Kuomintang Govemment.
While scholars reflect on China's vague presentation of historical evidence, a deeper yet recurring problem arises: the tendency of powerful
states to lay claim over resources and geo-space when opportunities and
abilities align. Already described as "the most important set of jurispru93
dential rulings in the modem history of the international law of the sea,
the South China Sea Arbitration will likely mark the beginning of a new set
of potentially destabilizing and dangerous encounters based on this deeper
problem. At stake is the long-established dogma defending high seas freedoms. But were they ever so secure?
In medicine, the correlation of particular signs and symptoms produce a set of characteristics known as a syndrome. 9 4 In maritime history,
the correlation between power and interests over pelagic space indicate a
similar syndromic convergence-a territorializing tendency that may reflect
a broader, systemic pathogenesis for the future of pelagic space and the
global commons, when not validated by other maritime powers as an
emerging customary norm or rule. International law may attempt to forestall the pathogenesis, but it has deep familiarity with the syndrome. Syndromes often take the form of eponyms because they bear the name of their
first identifier or describer, 9 5 or as with disease naming structures, the
event or place where they first appear. 96 In international law, no better
example of this territorializing syndrome exists than with the Treaty of Tor97
desillas (1494), where, facilitated by fifteenth century papal donation,
Portugal and Spain, acting as domini, divided the world in two. 98

first claimed the existence of such [historic rights in the waters of the South China Sea]
on 7th May 2009.") [https://perma.cc/3XWW-GR391.
92. Anthony Fensom, $5 Trillion Meltdown: What If China Shuts Down the South
China Sea? NAT'L INT. (July 16, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/5-trilhionmeltdown-what-if-china-shuts-down-the-south-china-16996
[https://perma.cc/SQ6CAKU3].
93. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Symposium on the South China Sea: The South China Sea
Arbitration Decision: The Need for Clarification, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 290, 290 (2016).
94. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1429 (5th ed., 2005) (defining a syndrome as
a "combination of signs and symptoms associated with a particular morbid process,
which together constitute the picture of a disease").

95. See,

e.g.,

Eponyms,

DOCTORSLOUNGE,

http://www.doctorslounge.com/stud

lounge/downdirty/eponyms.htm (listing alphabetically eponymous diseases and syndromes) [https://perma.cc/J8AZ-7DTZ].
96. For example, Legionnaires' disease, which first broke out at a convention of
American Legionnaires at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia in 1976. See Lily
Rothman, This Is How Legionnaires' Disease Got Its Name, TIME (Aug. 12, 2015), http://
time.com/3994453/legionnaires-disease-name-history-1976/
[https://perma.cc/S2D5UW46]; or Ebola, named after the closest river to where the disease first broke out. See
Bahar Gholipour, How Ebola Got Its Name, LFVESCIENCE (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.livescience.com/48234-how-ebola-got-its-name.html [https://perna.cc/96Z4-5WED].
97. See CiAREis GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 15-18 (1966) (discussing Alexander VI's
papal donations in the three celebrated bulls of 1493, leading to issuance of the fourth
bull, Dudum siquidem on September 26, 1493, which resulted in the Treaty of Tordesillas
in 1494).
98. See id. at 18 (acknowledging, although not explicitly stated in the treaty, that the
"Tordesillas line should be projected around the world into the Asiatic hemisphere.").
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China's claim to the South China Sea is not as encompassing, but it is
potentially more enforceable and almost as significant. The South China
Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, 99 with half of China's total shoreline adjacent to
1 1
and it accounts for five
it. 10 0 It is the world's fifth largest body of water,
trillion dollars in annual commercial activity involving one-third of maritime traffic worldwide. ' 0 2 Treaty of Tordesillas syndrome appears active in
the twenty-first century, ironically paralleling its European genesis, yet now
distinctly Sinocentric in imperial character.
Following this introduction, Part I will investigate the factual circumstances that layer complexity onto this dispute. These circumstances
involve consideration of China's construction of artificial islands in the
South China Sea and the understanding of historic entidement in international law. Elements of the opposing historical narratives will be reviewed,
not as typically done to weigh the value of effectivites supporting claims of
better title, but to highlight their limited appeal in view of the historical
penchant of states to claim control over resources when opportunities
arise. This penchant reflects the far more significant factual circumstance
at play here-as the Treaty of Tordesillas suggests in the history of international law. Part II reviews elements of this syndrome from historical and
contemporary law of the sea perspectives, and the Article concludes with
an assessment of the legal and political implications likely to radiate from
this Award for years to come.
1. The Award and Its Significance
On July 17, 2016, the PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines on every
substantive issue. 10 3 Disputed features were deemed rocks or low-tide elevations incapable of sustaining human habitation or economic life, thus
10 4
With regard
generating no entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf.
to China's historic claims, UNCLOS Article 298 provides that a state may
except from compulsory dispute settlement disputes relating to "sea
99. See South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), supra note 6, '1
3; see also Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu & Ted L. McDorman, Co-editor's Preface, in MAJrnME
ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra note 38, at ix (describing the South China Sea as
semi-enclosed, as defined in Art. 122 of UNCLOS).
100.

SARAH RAINE

&

CHRISTIAN LE MItRE, REGIONAL DISORDER: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

DISPUTES 17 (2013).
101. See Peter Kien-Hong Yu, The Chinese (Broken) U-Shaped Line in the South China
Sea: Points, Lines, and Zones, 25 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 405, 406 (2003) (noting the
South China Sea is the fifth largest body of water in the world).
102. See Fensom, supra note 92.
103. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 1203. Of the Tribunal's
sixteen declarations and findings, many consisting of multiple sub-findings, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines save for finding 6 (a) [Philippines' Submission No.
14] pertaining to the military stand-off on Second Thomas Shoal, where the Tribunal
found it had no jurisdiction to consider the Philippines' submission because it involved
"military activities" within the meaning of UNCLOS art. 298(1) (b). Id.
104. See South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 111203 (finding A (1))
(dismissing China's claim).
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boundary delimitations or . . .historic bays or tides. ' 10 5 Because China

invoked this exception in 2006,106 the Tribunal refused to review matters
"concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation."1' 0 7 But the
Tribunal proceeded to the merits on the question of historic rights as
opposed to historic title, which, in effect, refashioned the implications of
China's U-shaped line, making it a subject of arbitral review.' 0 8 The Tribunal circumvented the consideration that the U-shaped line may have constituted a sea boundary delimitation because the question of historic rightswhich "may include sovereignty"l 0 9 -also include "a broad and unspecified category of possible claims . . .falling short of sovereignty."' 1 0 The

Tribunal concluded nothing in the jurisdictional nullification clause of
UNCLOS Article 298 suggested historic rights falling short of sovereignty
were out of reach of arbitral review."' If China's presentation of the Ushaped line intended to artfully dodge third party review of its significance
as applied to the South China Sea, while ambiguously conflating rights of
ownership and rule over the area, then the Tribunal's decoupling of historic
rights from historic tide clarifies the role of UNCLOS and will stand as an
important legacy of the case. Moreover, the Tribunal found the exercise of
sovereign rights "is generally incompatible with another State having rights
to the same resources, in particular if such historic rights are considered
exclusive," 112 and rejected China's historic claims over the South China
Sea. 11 3 It held UNCLOS is a comprehensive agreement and contains no
114
provision preserving or protecting historic rights in variance with it.
105. UNCLOS art. 298(1)(a)(i) (involving optional exceptions to applicability of section 2 [relating to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions]).
106. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations made upon signature, ratification, accession or succession or anytime thereafter: Declaration of China,
UNITED NATIONS: OcEANs & LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention agreements/conventiondeclarations.htm#China Upon ratification (declaring that
China does not accept any procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS
with respect to all categories of disputes in Article 298 1 (a), (b), and (c)).
107. South China Sea Arbitration (jurisdiction and Admissibility), supra note 6, l
397.
108. Id.
109. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 225.
110. Id. T 226.
111. Id.
112. Id. 243.
113. Id. 1203.
114. Id. 246. UNCLOS arts. 10 and 15 admit prior use derogations in the limited
cases of historic bays and from territorial sea entitlement of a neighboring coastal state
in cases of historic tide affecting territorial sea boundary delimitations. These strict
limitations do not apply to EEZs, continental shelves, or high seas. These are the only
derogations based on historic rights contained in the convention. See South China Sea
Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 226 (noting no other mention of historic rights). As
a matter of plain geography, the Tribunal held "the South China Sea is not a bay." Id. 1
206. Although recognizing a pre-UNCLOS tendency to apply the "historic" descriptor to
"waters" not serving as "historic bays," the Tribunal referenced the International Court
of Justice's (ICJ) decision in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, which noted "'historic waters'
are usually meant waters which are treated as internal but which would not have that
character were it not for the existence of an historic title." Id. 3 220. The term "historic
waters" also has been applied to "a claim to territorial sea." Id. 225.
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The Tribunal further noted that during UNCLOS negotiations, China had
"resolutely opposed" any sharing of the EEZ with "other powers that had
historically fished in those waters;"' z 5 that China had opposed any other
limitation on that exclusive jurisdiction; and that China's position had
16
In any event, the
largely "prevailed in the final text of the Convention."'
any incomwhen
rights
Tribunal held the Convention supersedes earlier
1 17
arises.
patibility
A.

Unusual Factual Circumstances

Factual circumstances combined to make this case unusual although
not unique to Chinese efforts to enhance sovereign rights over the South
China Sea. 118 China built structures on submerged banks and reefs,
adding fill dredged up from the ocean's floor to fabricate elevations that do
1 19
It adulterated otherwise
not qualify as islands under the Convention.
tide mark (causing
the
high
above
barely
uninhabitable coral projections
1 20
in order to claim
damage)
environmental
substantial, even permanent
miles, which are
nautical
twelve
than
greater
zones
entitlement to maritime
115. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7,

251.

116. Id. 252.
117. Id. 9l 246.
118. See Jeremy Bender, China Isn't the Only One Building Islands in the South China
Sea, Bus. INSIDER (May 16, 2016, 1:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/vietnam(noting
building-islands-in-south-china-sea-2016-5/#spratly-island-2014-2016-1
Vietnamese island-building efforts on Southwest Cay (7.45 acres reclaimed), Spratly
(37.19 acres reclaimed), Sin Cowe (26.07 acres reclaimed), West Reef (70.50 acres
reclaimed), Sand Clay (9.19 acres reclaimed), Pearson Reef (6.03 acres reclaimed), Central Reef (4.13 acres reclaimed), Grierson Reef (3.52 acres reclaimed), Cornwallis South
Reef, Southeast (2.47 acres created from completely submerged reef), Cornwallis South
Reef, Southwest (1.70 acres created from completely submerged reef). [https://perma
.cc/RD8Q-4DFX]. Although not a claimant in the region, the U.S. advocates the cessation of "reclamation" projects by all parties. The Vietnamese acknowledge a military
presence on nineteen islands but claim the reclamation projects are "civilian in nature,"
and done on sovereign territory "to prevent.., soil erosion." Gen. Phung Quang Thanh,
Vietnamese Minister of Nat'l Def., Joint Press Conf. by Secretary Carter & Minister of
available at https://www
Nat'l Def. Thanh, in Hanoi, Viet. (June 1, 2015) (transcript
2
60
[https://perma.cc/
705
.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/
6S7D-BBEB]).
119. MATTHEW SOUTHERLAND, CHINA'S ISLAND BUILDING IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: DAMAGE TO THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT, IMPLICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, U.S.-CHINA

ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM'N 3 (2016); Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in
the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2
2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea- 016
Makes an
What
Mirasola,
Christopher
.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/AC7C-MC4M];
Island? Land Reclamation and the South China Sea Arbitration, ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY
INITIATVE (July 15, 2015), https://amti.csis.org/what-makes-an-island-land-reclamationand-the-south-china-sea-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/2KGX-ZXFL].
1203 (findings 16(b)
120. See South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7,
and (c)) (finding China has caused irreparable harm and permanent destruction to
coral reef ecosystems and natural conditions); see also SEBASTIAN C.A. FERSE ET AL.,
ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVI-

59-60 (2016),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1809 (concluding the spatial extent and
duration of the construction of artificial islands, including dredging, removal of geomorphological coral structures (bommies), has damaged up to sixty percent of the shallow
TIES ON SEVEN REEFS IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 1,
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accorded to "rocks" under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. 12 1 China previously
declared that all issues of sovereignty would be excluded from arbitral
jurisdiction, 12 2 invoking the compulsory dispute settlement opt-out provision allowable under UNCLOS, 1 23 and the Convention itself does not
address sovereignty claims by states over land territory in the South China
Sea.

1 24

Noting China's declaration excluding sovereignty claims from the
compulsory review of the Convention, the Philippines avoided seeking
such a determination of rightful ownership over the islands, concentrating
instead on the wrongfulness of the historic claim over the seas and the legal
classification of the outcroppings and submerged structures making up the
now misnamed Spratly "Islands.'

1 25

The Tribunal agreed. 1 26 While there

was "no question" a dispute existed between the parties as to land sovereignty over maritime features, 1 2 7 the Tribunal had not been asked to rule
on that question and concluded no implicit determination of sovereignty
radiated from its award. 1 28 Nevertheless, China rejected the Philippines'
note verbale announcing the intention to arbitrate,' 2 9 later refused to participate in the proceedings, 13 0 and published a Position Paper in December
2014 explaining that the dispute comprised an integral maritime boundary
question that could not be severally dissected but must be addressed as a
unitary whole,13 ' through a series of bilateral negotiations. 1 32
reef flat habitat permanently, significantly reduced nursery habitat for fish species and
caused near-permanent harm to reef habitat) [https://perma.cc/LF2F-H9X4].
121. See South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, TI 3-4.
122. See id. 1 8 (referencing China's Declaration of August 25, 2006)
123. See UNCLOS art. 298 (detailing optional exceptions).
124. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 5 (noting because the Convention does not address such sovereignty claims over land territory that the Tribunal's
decisions in this Award are not dependent on a finding of sovereignty over disputed
islands).
125. See id. 7. The Spratlys are not islands, nor do they appropriately form an
archipelago.
126. See id.
127. See South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), supra note 6, 1
152.
128. See id. '1 153.
129. Arbitration on the South China Sea: Rulings from The Hague, AsIA MAR. TRA.sPARENCY INITIATVE (Jan. 22, 2013), https://amti.csis.org/ArbitrationTL/ [https://perma
.cc/A8ND-MVK2].
130. August 1, 2013. Under Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention, the
absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the
proceedings." In its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, October 29, 2015, the
Tribunal found that it was properly constituted and that China's non-appearance did not
deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction.
131. See Government of the People's Republic of China, Position Paperof the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdictionin the South China Sea
Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.fmprc
.gov.cn/mfa-eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml (protesting the Philippines' dissection
of the Nansha Islands to gainsay China's sovereignty over the whole of the islands)
[https://perma.cc/K2PM-L5ZG]; see also South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction and
Admissibility) 7 154-55 (noting China's Position Paper). The Philippines' argument
essentially concentrated on the eight largest features located in the Spratly group, arguing that if none of these features could generate an entitlement to an EEZ or continental
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B. The Precursor to Artificial Geo-Space: Lighthouses
Creating geo-space as a basis for establishing legal rights to pelagic
space was a subject pondered as early as the Fur Seal Arbitration (1893)
with discussion about the territorializing effect of lighthouses placed on
islands. 13 3 Sir Charles Russell, co-representative of Great Britain in the
case, 134 argued such acquisition of title was possible, 135 but he encountered weighty opposition. Westlake, 13 6 Oppenheim, 1 37 and Gidel, 1 38 dismissed extensions of territorial sovereignty to the waters surrounding an
artificial structure, although, Gidel noted cases involving historic waters
could present an exception to the general doctrinal thrust opposing territorial extensions by such means. 13 9 Jessup, presciently, held "[i]t would be
dangerous doctrine in many parts of the world to allow states to appropri140
ate new areas of water by means of structures on hidden shoals."'
shelf then none of the other smaller features of the Spratlys could either. See generally
Loja, supra note 8 (discussing whether there is a basis to regard the Spratlys as a single
unit "whose minor features have the same fate as the principal features").
132. TRUONG & KARIM, supra note 33, at 1-2 (2016). Beijing's resistance to the
"multi-lateralization" of the South China Sea dispute has been interpreted as a desire to
avoid ASEAN and U.N. involvement. See Rodolfo C. Severino, Global Issues and National

Interest in the South China Sea, in THE

SOUTH CHINA SEA: A CRUCIBLE OF REGIONAL COOPER-

supra note 20, 31, 34-35 (C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy, eds., 2016). The
Chinese Society of International Law released a statement declaring the Award null and
void. CHINESE SOC'Y INT'L L., THE TRIBUNAL'S AWARD IN THE "SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION" INITIATED BY THE PHILIPPINES IS NULL AND VOID (2016), reprinted in 15 CHINESE J.
ATION,

INT'L L. 457, 457-58 (2016).

133. See JOHN BASSETT

MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS

900-01 (1898) (recounting the Fur Seal
Arbitration).
134. See J.C. Mathew, rev. Sinead Agnew, Charles Arthur Russell, Baron Russell of Killowen (1832-1900), Judge, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (2004), http://

TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY

www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/24301?docPos=1 (noting his representation of Great
Britain together with Sir R. Webster) [https://perma.cc/X8FY-EXQ9].
135. See MOORE, supra note 133, at 900-01 ("[I]f a light-house is built upon a rock or
upon piles driven into the bed of the sea, it becomes . . . part of the territory of the
nation which erected it... The right to acquire by the construction of a light-house on a
rock in mid-ocean a territorial right in respect of the space so occupied is undoubted").
136. I. JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (PEACE) 186 (1904) ("It would be difficult
to admit that a mere rock and building, incapable of being so armed as really to control
the neighboring sea, could be made the source of a presumed occupation of it, converting a large tract into territorial water.").
137. I. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 341 (3d ed., Ronald F. Roxburgh
ed., 1920-1921) ("It is tempting to compare such lighthouses with islands ... Just as a
state may not claim sovereignty over a maritime belt around an anchored lightship, so it
may not make such a claim in the case of a lighthouse in the open sea."). Cf. PHILIP C.
JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 69 (1927) (citing
Oppenheim).
138. GILBERT GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER: LE TEMPS DE PAIX (LA
MER TERRITORIALE ET LA ZONE CONTIGUt) 677 (3d ed. 1934) ("Le statut juridique d'un

phare ne depend pas de l'existence du phare lui-meme, mais de la nature de l'elvation du sol
sur laquelle il est construit.").
139. Id. at 679 ("II y a lieu, bien entendu, de reserver le cas oft ces phares seraient dlevts
dans des eaux a considerer comme 'historiques'.").
140. JESSUP, supra note 137, at 69.
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A committee of experts established by the League of Nations explored
the matter in sub-committee II (territorial waters) of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, but that conference fell far short of its intended
goals. 1 4 1 The issue took on "new urgency" due to territorializing questions
14 2
posed by new structures-such as drilling platforms and oil derricks
created after the birth of the continental shelf doctrine following the 1945
Truman Proclamations. 1 4 3 UNCLOS disposed of the territorializing effect
144
of artificial structures, depriving them of the status of islands.
C.

The Post War Scramble for the South China Sea

During that time, an array of possessory interests found expression in
the South China Sea. Japan set imperial designs on the Spratlys in 1939145
as part of a strategy to neutralize Australia. 146 Japan's defeat set off a
"scramble to occupy the islands" involving China and countries
of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines, and later Vietnam. 147 Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang
Government claimed the Paracel Islands in 1945,148 which had been part
of French Indochina, 14 9 and took hold of the Spratly's largest islet, Itu Aba,
in 1946; however, it abandoned this garrison by 1951, only to return in
141. See Hunter Miller, The Hague Codification Conference 24 AM J. INT'L L. 674, 693
(1930) (noting that the program was too extensive and temporally limited to achieve
conclusive results).
142. D.H.N. Johnson, Artificial Islands, 4 INT'L L.Q. 203, 203 (1951).
143. See Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed, Reg, 12301, 12303 (Oct. 2, 1945), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12332 (detailing United States policy with respect
to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf in the Truman
Era) [https://perma.cc/6XUB-THU9]; Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12301,
12304 (Oct. 2, 1945), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58816 (detailing
United States policy with respect to coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas in
the Truman Era).
144. See UNCLOS art. 60 (8) ("Artificial islands, installations and structures do not
possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the [EEZ] or the continental
shelf."); see also Grigoris Tsaltas et al., Artificial Islands and Structures as a Means of
SafeguardingState Sovereignty Against Sea Level Rise: A Law of the Sea Perspective 1, 5, 11
(2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2409890 (for commentary on UNCLOS art. 60(8))
[https://perma.cc/JB3K-W8L2].
145. Backgrounder, Understanding China's Position on the South China Sea Disputes,
INST. SECURITY & DEv. POL'Y 1, 3 (2016).
146. See generally PETER STANLEY, INVADING AusTRALIA: JAPAN AND THE BATTLE FOR AusrA.LL4, 1942 (2008) (discussing Japanese war plans and Australian fears of invasion).
147. Leszek Buszynski, The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China
Strategic Rivalry, 35 WASH. Q. 139, 139 (2012).
148. See Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Diplomacy on the Rocks: China and Other Claimants in
the South China Sea, CHASFREEMAN.NET (Apr. 10, 2015), http://chasfreeman.net/diplomacy-on-the-rocks-china-and-other-claimants-in-the-south-china-sea/ (remarking that the
Republic of China declared the archipelagos of the Paracel and Spratly Islands as part of
Guangdong Province) [https://perma.cc/ULV7-WWS6].
149. France had claimed them in the 1930s as part of an 1887 Treaty with China
securing a French protectorate over Tonkin (northernmost Vietnam). See Murphy, supra
note 90, at 191; Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of Sovereignty Over Spratly and Paracel
Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 399, 400-01
(1991).
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1956.150 The Cairo Declaration (1943) affirmed that "all territories Japan
has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and
of
the Pescadores [Penghu Islands], shall be restored to the Republic 152
China" 15 1 and the Potsdam Declaration (1945) affirmed these terms.
Chinese authorities repeatedly quote these documents as recognition of
China's claim over the South China Sea, 15 3 but the declarations pertained
of ownership of other
only to two South China Sea islands. The question
1 54
features controlled by Japan was not addressed.
In 1956, a Filipino lawyer and businessman, Tomas Cloma, attempted
to create the microstate of Freedomland (Kalayaan in Tagalog) on thirtythree islets, reefs, and shoals off Palawan Island in 1956.155 He reasoned
that Japan's defeat rendered the area res nullius and "open to whoever was
first on the scene."' 15 6 After Cloma relinquished his claim in 1974, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos annexed and then occupied a portion of
the islands. 157 Malaysia claimed the three southernmost Spratlys in 1978,
issued a map of their Malaysian continental shelf in 1979 that included the
islands, established a military garrison on Swallow Island in 1983, and
occupied two other islands in 1986.158 Vietnam pressed its claim of sovereignty over the Spratlys at the San Francisco Conference in 1951,159 occu-

pied them in 1973, and then ceded control to the North Vietnamese in
1975.160 The People's Republic of China proclaimed a territorial sea
around the Spratly Islands (Nansha) in 1958,161 and openly skirmished
150. See Murphy, supra note 90, at 192-93.
151. Cairo Conference 1943, AVALON PROJECT (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/
cairo.asp [https://perma.cc/8FT7-FSBM].
152. Potsdam Declaration:ProclamationDefining Terms for JapaneseSurrender, Issued
July 26, 1945, NAT'L DIET LIBR. (last visited Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html [https://perma.cc/BVG5-EVE5].
153. See Backgrounder, supra note 145 (citing the declarations as part of the international recognition of its claim over the South China Sea). Cf. Wu, SOLVING DISPUTES,
supra note 14, at 62-63 (discussing the significance of the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations).
154. Bill Hayton, South China Sea Disputes: Still No Evidence of Historical Claims, RSIS
COMMENT. (Aug. 2014), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/C0141
69.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7CP-CF8W].
155. See Ulises Granados, Ocean Frontier Expansion and the Kalayaan Islands Group
Claim: Philippines' Postwar Pragmatismin the South China Sea, 9 INT'L REL. AsIA-PACIFIC
267, 273-74 (2008) (discussing Cloma's claim of discovery of Freedomland and assertion of title as Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Council); see also Murphy,
supra note 90, at 193.
156. Leszek Buszynski, The Development of the South China Sea Maritime Dispute 4, 8
(2013).
157. The Marcos regime imprisoned Cloma, where, on December 4, 1974, he signed a
Deed of Assignment and Waiver of Rights to the Philippine government for all claims
over the area. See Granados, supra note 155, at 283. Marcos annexed the Kalayaan
Island Group through Presidential Decree 1596 on June 11, 1978. See id.
158. See Murphy, supra note 90, at 194 (discussing Malaysia's claims on three of the
southernmost Spratlys).
159. See id. at 193 (noting the Vietnamese claim of sovereignty over the Spratlys at the
San Francisco conference was "uncontested and virtually unnoticed).
160. See id. at 194.
161. Id.
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with the Vietnamese in 1988.162 When not hotly contested, the islandsremote and vulnerable to tropical storms-attracted little interest except
from enterprising fishermen and phosphate miners. 16 3 Oil strikes off the
coasts of Malaysia and Brunei in the 1970s brought renewed attention to
the waters, 164 and the sea's hydrocarbon reserves created tensions between
China and other countries. 165 China promulgated domestic legislation
proclaiming ownership of the Spratlys (Nansha), Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel
(Xisha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), 166 and most of the South China
Sea in 1992.167 Currently, "Brunei Darussalam, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam claim some or all of the islands in the Spratly Islands.
China and the Philippines claim the islands in Scarborough Shoal, and
China and Vietnam claim the Paracel Islands." 168 Taiwan claims the same
islands as China, 1 69 resulting in one bit of common ground: Taiwan also
170
repudiates the Tribunal's Award.
All states bordering the South China Sea and claiming overlapping
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea are parties to
UNCLOS. 17 1 The Convention may have assumed that sovereignty over
land and island features were settled issues; "[iut sets out what maritime
162.

See Stein Tonnesson, 14 March 1988: East Asia's Last Interstate Battle, PRIO/

BLOGS,

http://blogs.prio.org/2015/07/14-march-1988-east-asias-last-interstate-battle/

(discussing attack of Vietnamese soldiers on a disputed Spratly shoal, resulting in sixtyfour Vietnamese deaths) [https://perma.cc/9DHE-K6MW].
163. Murphy, supra note 90, at 188.
164. Id. at 189.
165. Buszynski, supra note 147, at 139 (tension between China and Vietnam). People's Republic of China's Premier, Li Peng, and Taiwan's Foreign Minister, Frederick
Chien, laid claim to the Sprady (Xisha) and Paracel (Nansha) Islands in 1990. Japan
occupied them and two other groups of South China Sea islands belonging to China
(Dongsha and Zhongsha) during World War II; Vietnam claimed them at the 1951 San
Francisco Peace Conference. See Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of Sovereignty Over
Spratly and ParacelIslands: A Historicaland Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
399, 400-01 (1991).
166. See Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (promulgated by Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Feb.
25, 1992, effective Feb. 25, 1992) Order No. 55, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/
laws/lotprocottsatcz739/ (claiming the islands inter alia as land territory belonging to
China) [https://perma.cc/UCQ6-Y5UB]; Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, (promulgated by Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, June 26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998) Order No.
6, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocoteezatcs790/ (claiming sovereign
rights pertaining to the EEZ and continental shelf) [https://perma.cc/GQ2N-DDYQ].
167. See Murphy, supra note 90, at 195 (referencing the 1992 domestic legislation).
168. Robert C. Beckman, The Philippines v. China Case and the South China Sea Dis-

putes, in

TERRITORIAL

DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: NAVIGATING ROUGH WATERS,

supra note 13, at 54.
169. Id.
170. JR. Wu & Faith Hung, Taiwan Rejects Ruling on South China Sea Island of Itu Aba,
REUTERS (July 12, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-taiwan-idUSKCNOZS165 (noting the maps China bases its South China Sea claims on trace
to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist rule) [https://perma.cc/VZ88-MQXH].
171. Sam Bateman, Sovereignty as an Obstacle to Effective Oceans Governance and Maritime Boundary Making- the Case of the South China Sea, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICTION, 219 (Clive Scholfield et al. eds., 2014).
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zones can be claimed by States from their land territory and islands, and
the rights and duties of coastal States and other States in the various mariof
time zones.' 72 UNCLOS does provide for exceptional consideration 173
historic claims, but the Tribunal found those provisions inapplicable,
reasoning, as a matter of plain geography, that "the South China Sea is not
a bay."' 1 74 A brief review of international law's treatment of acquisition by
historic title weakens China's argument but not its unyielding sense of
entitlement.
D.

The Necessary But Exceptional Theory of Historic Waters in
International Law

Confusion over the breadth of the territorial sea and the rights of
coastal states over adjacent waters brought attention to the concept of historic rights during the 1930 Hague Codification Conference. 175 Walther
Schucking led a draft initiative to demarcate the breadth of the territorial
sea, which necessarily focused on distinctions between inland and international waters. 176 He initially suggested a ten-mile closing line for the
mouth of a bay subject to exceptional cases demonstrated by continuous
and immemorial usage. 1 7 7 Interestingly, he was focused on the concept of
closing off a single-state bay. 1 7 8 The draft articles did not contemplate
bays bordering on the land of two or more states, 17 9 much less extending
or analogizing the concept of the historic bay to close off tide to a semienclosed sea. Balancing the concept of freedom of the seas with the interests of the immediately adjacent coast state was the only kind of exclusion
contemplated over claims to the sea.' 8 0 In the drafting of UNCLOS, the
issue of the semi-enclosed sea presented a "microcosm" of "virtually all" of
the strategic tensions between the coastal states and the maritime states,
making it necessary to treat such areas in terms of universally applicable
provisions. 18 1 Bernard Oxman, advocate of the Philippines, argued the
same point before the Tribunal: "Since the emergence of modern international law, the semi-enclosed seas have been, and remain, a principal object
172. Beckman, supra note 168, at 55.
173. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
206.
174. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7,
175. See Miller, supra note 141, at 688 (noting forestalled efforts to find common
agreement on historic rights).
176. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening, 1992 I.CJ. Rep. 351, 732 ' 15-16 (Diss. Op. Judge Oda) [hereinafter
Gulf of Fonseca Case].
177. See id. cj 15. The concept of historic waters would also be applied to waters other
than bays, for instance straits and archipelagos. See Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea
Arbitration:Is There a Case to Answer?, inTHE SouTH CHINA SEA ARmITATION: A CHINESE
PERSPECTIVE 15, 49 (Stefan Talmon & Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014).
178. See Gulf Fonseca Case, 1992 I.CJ. Rep. at 732 ' 15 ("[Sch~icking] had conceived
that the legal concept of a bay would be applicable solely to a single-State bay.").
179. See id.
180. John R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1975).
181. Id.
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of the universal rules of the law of the sea."' 82
The United States resisted formation of a commission to draw up a list
of historic waters on the grounds that individual governments, not an international commission, could only engage in such discussions, associating
the concept of historic bays with interior waters. 18 3 The ICJ later made this
connection more explicit, holding in the Fisheries Case: "By 'historic waters'
are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which
would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic
title."' 84 Prescriptive title over the closed off waters vested with the immediately adjacent coastal state, eventually codifying into a twenty-four mile
closing line separating historic bays from seaward projections.' 8 5 Gidel
labeled the theory of historic waters necessary but exceptional' 8 6 -a deviation, elsewhere summed up by Judge Shigeru Oda, from "the general rule
whereby the territorial sea of each riparian state is measured from that
87
state's own coastline.'
Animated by the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea in 1958, the International Law Commission returned to the subject
and petitioned the Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs to
study the question of historic waters under international law.' 8 8 issued
under the aegis of the Secretariat, the study concluded that superficial
agreement about the validity of historic title, again, adjacent to coasts, was
uncontested but agreement on a precise definition was "not possible."'18 9
In line with the Fisheries Case, and supported by leading authority, 190 the
study recognized a distinction between historic bays and historic waters,
ascribing a "wider scope" to the latter while recognizing more frequent
usages attaching to the former. 19 1 Subsequent case law has noted those
more frequent usages are tailored to "concrete" and particular cases,192 in
the context of limited and long-standing usages.' 9 3 While the study
182. Final Transcript Day 1 -Merits Hearing at 62, In re South China Sea Arbitration,
PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/

sendAttach/1547 [[https://perma.cc/3XWW-GR39].
183. See Miller, supra note 141, at 690-91 (reprinting the proposal from the Norwegian delegation and the response from the United States delegation).
184. Fisheries Case (U.K. v Nor.), Judgment, 1951 LCJ. Rep. 116, 130. (Dec. 18,
1951).
185. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone art. 7(5), 516
U.N.T.S. 205, Apr. 29, 1958.
186. Gidel, supra note 138, at 651.
187. Gulf Fonseca Case, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. at 742 7 18 (Diss. Op. Judge Oda).
188. See Secretariat, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N.
Doc No. A/CN.4/143 (9 Mar. 1962), in [1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1 911 (1964).
189. Id. 9 33, 36.
190. See, e.g., id. 1 34, 36 (quoting Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "There seems to be no
ground of principle for confining the concept of historic waters merely to the waters of a
bay .... [a] claim could equally be made on an historic basis to other waters.").
191. Id.
192. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.CJ. REP.
55, 74 (Feb. 24, 1982); Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 I.CJ. REp. at 589 1 385 (requiring
investigation into the particular history of the purported historic water).
193. See Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 L.CJ. Rep. at 732 c 11, 743 (Diss. Op. Judge
Oda) (noting limited historical examples such as the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays on

2017

Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome

acknowledged the possibility of securing title through acquisitive prescription, based on immemorial possession or the perfection of defective original title through acquiescence (borrowing from the principle of usucapio in
Roman law), 194 proof of such title required rigorous review and exception19 5
ally strong circumstances in order to prevail.
The acquisition of historic title in international law now requires satisfaction of three conditions. The state must exercise the necessary jurisdiction over the water; it must exercise that authority continuously for a long
period of time (evidencing possesio96longi temporis); and it must do so without opposition from other states.'
E.

The U-Shaped Map

China places much emphasis of its historic claim to the South China
Sea on a map detailing the U-shaped line. 19 7 China has not provided an
explanation of the origins of the U-Shaped line,' 98 but it is a key consideration in establishing China's historic entitlement. 19 9 The dotted line has an
interesting and somewhat discordant provenance. An 1897 map of China's
southeast coastal Guangdong Province and Hainan Island included no
other island markings as part of a territorial claim by Chinese authorities. 20 0 But by 1909, the domestic political landscape in China had
changed dramatically, as had the political fortunes of the Qing Dynasty, in
face of national humiliations. 20 ' A series of nationalistic challenges to the
the Atlantic seaboard, part of the Bristol Channel, and Conception Bay in Newfoundland). The majority opinion, objected to by Judge Oda, also classified the Gulf of Fonseca as a historic bay, following the finding of a decision rendered by a 1917 Central
American Court of Justice decision. See id. 1 432 (1).
194. Secretariat, supra note 188, 63.
195. Id. cj 40.

196. Fisheries Case, Judgment, 1951 I.CJ. Rep. at 18; see also Secretariat, supra note
188, 1 80, 185 (1964). Cf.Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 840 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928) (establishing territorial sovereignty "by the continuous and peaceful display of the functions of state within a given region).
197. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Parting the South China Sea: How to Uphold the Rule of Law,
95 FOREIGN AFT. 76, 76 (2016).
198. Keyuan Zou & Xinchang Liu, The U-Shaped Line and Historic Rights in the Philippines v. China Arbitration Case, 127, 132, in ARBITRATION CONCERNING THE SOUTH CHINA

SEA: PHILIPPINES VERSUS CHINA (Shicun Wu & Keyuan Zou eds., 2016) (noting no official
explanation for the line); Rapp-Hooper, supra note 197, at 76.
199. Rapp-Hooper, supra note 197, at 76.
200. Bill Hayton, The Modern Origins of China's South China Sea Claim, CSIS ASIA
MAR, TRANSPARENCY INiTIATIvE 7:10-7:18 (Sept. 22, 2016), https://amti.csis.org/event-

[https://perma.cc/2XK8modern-origins-chinas-south-china-sea-claim-bill-hayton/
RDRL]. Hayton also has noted that other official Chinese maps preceding 1897,
whether national, regional, or local, (citing examples of 1760, 1784 and 1866 maps)
located Hainan Island as the southernmost point of Chinese territory. HAYTON, supra
note 26, at 52.
201. China suffered a series of humiliations during this period, beginning with the
Opium War (1840-1842), the Sino-French War (1883-1885), Japan's defeat of the Qing
Dynasty in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), and the resulting independence of tributary states, Korea and Taiwan, along with the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (by
the Eight-Nation Alliance: Austria-Hungary, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia,
and the U.S.). See George P. Jan, The Doctrine of Nationalism and the Chinese Revolution,
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Qing Court by Sun Yat-Sen's rebellious factions in southeastern China
threatened political stability. 20 2 A nationalist Guangdong (Canton
Merchants') Self-Government Society had formed to counter British, Portuguese, and Japanese maritime and riparian intrusions and take part in a
coalescing national identity. 20 3 Facing a deepening legitimacy crisis, the
Qing Court unexpectedly confronted a Japanese commercial mining
(guano) enterprise on the Pratas Shoal, which the merchant had claimed
by right of discovery. 20 4 Pressured by the Self-Government Society, which
collected travelers' testimonials and oral histories of fishermen "to prove
that the islands were historically Chinese, '20 5 the Qing Court negotiated a
resourceful but expensive buy-out-a key 6turning point in China's awaken20
ing interests over the South China Sea.
Although based on ancient claims, the line first appeared in a map by
Hu Jinjie, a private Chinese cartographer in December 1914,207 and was
thereafter incorporated into a map produced by the Republic of China
Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee of 1935.208 Hu's map had
incorporated "the extent of Chinese state 'control' before 1736," but had
included only the Pratas and Paracels, and went no further south than 150
North. 20 9 Chinese maps subsequently published during the 1920s and
1930s reflected Hu's rendition, 2 10 and map publishers began publishing
the names of the features of the four major island groups in the Sea. 2 1 1 But
French imperial claims over six of the Spratlys in 1933 may have sparked a
"primordial possessive instinct" to counter the French claims, 2 12 and more
broadly, to create a great defensive pelagic wall around its "blue-colored
DOCTRINE IN THE MODERN WORLD 138, 140-42 (Chu-yuan Cheng ed.,
1989) (discussing the emergence of modem Chinese nationalism); see also DONG WONG,

in SUN YAT-SEN'S

(on the mid-nineteenth
century emergence of the polemical use of the phrase "unequal treaties" in the formation
and expression of Chinese nationalism).
202. See generally HAROLD Z. SCHIFFRIN, SUN YAT-SEN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE
CHINA'S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (2005)

REVOLUTION

203.
TUNG,

ch. IV (1968) (discussing revolutionary activity to seize Canton).

See EDWARD J.M. RHOADS, CHINA'S REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION: THE CASE OF KWANG-

1895-1913, 130-52 (1975).

204. See id. at 140-41.
205. Id. at 141.
206. See HAYTON, supra note 26, at 51 (detailing thatJapan recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Pratas in exchange for a payment to the Japanese merchant of one hundred and thirty thousand dollars).
207. Keyuan Zou, The Chinese TraditionalMaritime Boundary Line in the South China
Sea and Its Legal Consequencesfor the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands, 14
INT'LJ. MARINE & COASTAL L. 27, 32 (1999); cf., Wu, supra note 14, at 79.
208. See Yu, supra note 101, at 407; HAYTON, supra note 26, at 52-53.
209. HAYtON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra note 26, at 53.
210. See Yu, supra note 101, at 407; Zou, supra note 207, at 32.
211. Wu, supra note 14, at 79 (noting the four island groups-Dongsha/Pratas,
Xisha/Paracel, Zhongsha/Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Reef and Nansha/Spratly-as
well as the southernmost extension of China's maritime claim-the James Shoal).
212. Yu, supra note 101, at 407. Zou also attributes importance to the year 1933 and
the assertion of French claims over some of the Spratlys as Vietnam's protector, although
Zou claims France claimed nine islands. See Zou, supra note 207, at 32-33.
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land"-the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. 2 13 Bai Meichu, a
founder of the China Geographical Society, adapted Hu's map and added
the "innovation" of the U-shaped line 2 1 4 which went through iterations
until "first published,

' 2 15

"revealed, ' 216 or "released" 2 17 by the Nationalist

Government of the Republic of China (ROC, 1912-1949) in 1947, or
printed in 1947 and published in 1948.218 The ROC map "is widely recognized as the first official map showing China's claims." 2 19 It was titled
"Map of South China Sea Islands" and presented eleven dashes, with two
220
additional lines snaking into the Gulf of Tonkin.
A 2000 accord between China and Vietnam formally delimited respective boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin. 22 1 Two lines were erased in the Tonkin Gulf, resulting in the nine-dash line in the map that China appended to
its 2009 note verbale.2 22 The Tribunal found that "the line has appeared
consistently in that nine-dash form in official Chinese cartography since
that date" but "[t]he length and precise placement of individual dashes,
however, do not appear to be entirely consistent among different official
223
depictions of the line."

213. Peng Guangqian, China's Maritime Rights and Interests, in MILITARY AcTVITIES IN
THE EEZ 15, 15-16 (Peter Dutton, ed., 2010).

214. HAYTON, supra note 26, at 56. See also Zou, supra note 207, at 33 (noting the Ushaped line had appeared in privately produced cartography in 1936).
215. M. Sheng-Ti Gau, The U-Shaped Line and a Categorizationof the Ocean Disputes in
the South China Sea, 43 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 57, 58 (2012).
216. Rapp-Hooper, supra note 197, at 76.
217. Kuan-Hsiung Wang, The ROC's Maritime Claims and Practiceswith Special Reference to the South China Sea, 41 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 237, 243 (2010).
218. Li & Li, supra note 26, at 290. U.S. State Department analysts Kevin Baumert
and Brian Melchior reviewed variances in publication histories and settled for simplicity's sake on 1947. See Baumert & Melchior, supra note 27, at 3 n.5. The map was
drawn by cartographer Bai Meichu. See Yu, supra note 101, at 407 (discussing Bai's
official drawing prompted by Chinese sovereignty interests stemming from France's
1933 take-over of six of the Spratly Islands). The Tribunal held the line first appeared
on an official Chinese map in 1948. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7,
181.
219. Wu, supra note 14, at 79.
220. Baumert & Melchior, supra note 27, at 3.
221. List of GeographicalCoordinates of Points, The Agreement on the Delimitation of the
TerritorialSea, the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in Beibu Bay/Gulf of

Tonkin, China-Viet., Dec. 25, 2000, 56

LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN

137, 137 (2004).

222. Note Verbale from China to the U.N. Secretary General (May 7, 2009).
223. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 91 181. In January 2013,
China introduced a ten-dash line, with the additional line projecting eastward of Taiwan
into the East China Sea, purportedly emphasizing Taiwan's status as a Chinese province.
The new map has been transposed as a background in new Chinese passports. See Euan
Graham, China's New Map: Just Another Dash? RUSI NEWSBRIEF (Sept. 3, 2013), https://
rusi.org/publication/newsbrief/chinaE2%80%99s-new-map-just-another-dash [https:/
/perma.cc/H9LX-MEYZ]; see also Baumert & Melchior, supra note 27, at 6 (depicting a
graphic presentation of changes to the dashed line presented in 2009 and 1947 Chinese
maps).
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Nanhai Zhudao Map, 1947 (Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea). Wikimedia
Commons: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/43/19 4 7 -Nanhai_
Zhudao.png [https://perma.cc/A489-MBZN].

F.

China's Historical Narrative

While the map does not appear to be ancient at all, historical narratives also are proffered to buttress insufficient cartographic evidence estab-
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lishing China's historical claim over the South China Sea. Chinese
scholars are unable to agree on when the Spratlys were discovered but various claims range from the Spring and Autumn period of the Eastern Zhou
dynasty (770-256 B.C.E.), to references in classical literature (for instance,
poems in the Book of Songs, the Commentaries of Zuo, and the Discourses of
22 4
the States) and to archeological evidence found on the Xisha Islands.
But this evidence, wrapped up in historical narratives, is equally problematic. It stimulates complaints that China deploys historical arguments to
escape from the legal commitments required by UNCLOS. 2 25

Historical

narratives can be compelling in an area so rich in dynastic tradition-the
Funan and Khmer in Cambodia, the spread of the Sanskrit cosmopolis,

22 6

the Champa in the Mekong and the Mac in northern Vietnam, the sultanates of Malacca and Indonesia, and, of course, the Han and Ming dynasties
in China-but they contribute to "South Asia's luxuriant cultural polymorphism

' ' 22 7

more so than a definitive, indivisible, and uninterrupted claim

of dominum over the pelagic highway that contributed to such polymorphism. In its finding that Scarborough Shoal has been a traditional fishing
ground of many nationalities, 228 the Tribunal concluded the interpretation
22 9
of historical narratives needed to be "approached with sensitivity.
Artisanal practices passed down through generations had "not been considered of interest to official record keepers or to the writers of history" but
the selective recordings of this history "[did] not make them less important
to those who practice them. '230 This sense of parochialism abounds in the
history of the South China Sea and is reminiscent of the Portuguese claim
that they were the first navigators of the sea leading to the Indians (East
Asian trade routes)-a claim Hugo Grotius labeled "absurd" in Mare
Liberum more than four hundred years ago. 2 3 1 China's assertions seem
equally absurd to the other South China Sea coastal states and have
spawned new maritime narratives. For instance, in Vietnam, formerly
"marginal" islands in the South China Sea are now at the center of "a reimagined map of the nation's territory... a figurative cartographic navel of
the national geo-body," 2 32 projecting Vietnamese sovereignty claims over
224. Wu, supra note 14, at 16.
225. See, e.g., Bill Hayton, The Importance of Evidence: Fact, Fiction and the South
China Sea, AsiA SENTINEL (May 25, 2015), http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/fact-fiction-south-china-sea/ [https://perma.cc/VD64-75EX].
226. See generally SHELDON POLLOCK, THE LANGUAGE OF THE GODS IN THE WORLD OF
MEN: SANSKRIT, CULTURE, AND POWER IN PREMODERN INDIA (2006) (on the rise of Sanskrit

cosmopolitan culture followed by the establishment of vernacular expression).
227. VICTOR LIEBERMAN, STRANGE PARALLELS: SOUTHEAST ASIA IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, C.
800-1830: VOLUME 2, MAINLAND MIRRORS: EUROPE, JAPAN, CHINA, SOUTH ASIA, AND THE
ISLANDS 680 (2009).
228. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, 9 805.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231.

HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 1609-2009, at 85 (Robert Feenstra ed., 2009)

(1609).
232. Edyta Roszko, Geographies of Connection and Disconnection: Narratives of Seafaring in Ly So'n, in CONNECTED AND DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM: REMAKING SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A POST-SOCIALIST NATION 347, 349 (Philip Taylor ed., 2016) (noting the
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portions of the South China Sea. 2 33 South China Sea coastal states have
their own versions of history, but "no one state seems to have actually exer23 4
cised dominant authority to the exclusion of all others.
Chinese historical narratives often trace to the maritime Silk Road
trade route, dating to the Qin (221-206 B.C.E.) and Han (206 B.C.E.-220
A.D.) dynasties, and flourishing in the Tang (618-907) and Song dynasties
(960-1279).235 This sea route, which had at its center the South China
Sea, not only preceded its land counterpart, but also extended farther and
endured longer. 23 6 China's Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) set sail on
seven fabled voyages across the South China Sea; 23 7 Ming Dynasty records
(the Ming shi-lu) detail other important Chinese commanders and voyages,
as well. 23 8 Zheng's first armada (1405-1407) of 317 ships provisioned
27,800 mariners, soldiers, and functionaries. 23 9 The astonishing size of
this flotilla totaled two-thirds more than the total European and Eurasian
240
population of Asia Portuguesaat any time during the sixteenth century.
The junks alone that supplied the Ming expeditions with water and rice
numbered about the same as the largest Portuguese expedition ever sent to
Asian waters. 24 1 Zheng charted the waters connecting China to the disputed islands of the South China Sea while en route to Champa (southern
Vietnam), Malacca, India, and later East Africa. 2 42 Chinese authorities
note these charts were published throughout the Ming (1368-1644) and
Vietnamese party-state framed sovereignty claims in terms of historical and emotional
stories of Vietnamese sailors).
233. Id.
234. Peter A. Dutton, An Analysis of China's Claim to Historic Rights in the South China
Sea, in MAJOR LAw AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES 57, 73 (Yann-Huei Song & Keyuan Zou eds., 2014).
235. Gao &Jia, supra note 16, at 101; Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, China Versus Vietnam: An
Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea, 2014 CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS 1, 5-6 (2014) (referring to China's claim that a number of historical accounts
trace to China's discovery of the South China Sea Islands during the Han Dynasty, with
additional evidence from the Tang and Song dynasties); see also Jianming Shen, China's
Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A HistoricalPerspective, 1 CHINESEJ. INT'L L.
94, 101-05 (2002) (discussing evidence of Chinese discovery centuries before the Qin
and Han dynasties).
236. Gao & Jia, supra note 16, at 101.
237. See Sue Gronewald, The Ming Voyages, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS, http://
afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china-I 000ce-mingvoyages.htm
[https://perma.cc/
RBL3-7TA3]; MAR.MUSEUM, Admiral Zheng He and the Chinese Treasure Fleet, http://education.maritime-museum.org/training/north-gallery-2/asian-history/admiral-zheng-heand-the-chinese-treasure-fleet/ [https://perma.cc/3F9T-KT5S].
238. See generally Geoff Wade, The "Ming shi-lu" as a Source for Thai History: Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries, 31 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 249-94 (2000) (canvassing
such voyages to and from Siam with detailed appendices).
239. Robert Finlay, The Treasure-Ships of Zheng He: Chinese Maritime Imperialism in
the Age of Discovery, 23 TERRAE INCOGNITAE 1, 7-8 (1991) (noting the size and composition of the flotilla); Gronewald, supra note 237; see also MARINERS' MUSEUM, Zheng He:
The First Voyage of the Treasure Fleet, http://ageofex.marinersmuseum.org/index.php?
type=explorersection&id=51 [https://perma.cc/6LMA-SZBE].
240. See Finlay, supra note 239, at 4.
241. See id.
242. Li Dexia & Tan Keng Tat, South China Sea Disputes: China Has Evidence of Historical Claims, 165 RSIS COMMENT. No. 1, 2 (2014); see also Geoff Wade, The Zheng He
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Qing (1644-1912) dynasties, 243 claiming that this evidence demonstrates
how China's maritime and military power extended to the Indian
Ocean, 2 44 but not necessarily its desire to exercise dominium over the
South China Sea. 245 Historians debate the hegemonic, defensive, explora46
tory, and propagandistic intentions of the voyages, 2 but they largely agree
that these voyages were structured for trade and were "overwhelmingly military in composition. '24 7 In addition to the unsettled debate as to China's
intentions for dispatching the voyages, historians debate why the Con248
fucian controllers of the Ming Court suddenly recalled these voyages,
thus opening the way for successive waves of European advancement into
Southeast Asian waters in search of emporia. "China didn't possess
another naval ship capable of reaching the islands of the South China Sea
24 9
until it was given one by the United States [five hundred] years later,"
conclusion that "in no sense did any state or people
leading to the general
'own' the Sea."' 2 5 0 According to Greg Austin, "the PRC [People's Republic
of China] has highlighted the fact that on each [Zheng] voyage, the ships
passed through the Spratly Islands," but that there is no evidence of China
exercising sovereign authority. 2 51 "General historical 'trawling' to demonstrate that people of a particular nationality visited a locality is not evi25 2
dence that an international tribunal would regard as material.
Moreover, "dangers posed by the reefs and islands of the Spratlys" indi253
were
given that mariners
cated they were areas mariners should avoid,
2 54
pirates.
and
shipwreck
avoid
to
shores
the
hug
to
more prone
Modem English language narratives on the South China Sea have
been criticized for overreliance on histories published in 1976 and
1982.255 These histories relied on three non-neutral Chinese accounts jusVoyages: A Reassessment, 78 J. MALAYSIAN BRANCH ROYAL ASIATIC Soc'Y 37-58 (2006)
(assessing the proto-colonial implications of Zheng's voyages).
243. China's Position Paper, supra note 90.
244. See Finlay, supra note 239, at 7-8 (noting the overwhelming military composition of the Zheng's Treasure-fleet inclining "their hosts to consider that a client relationship with the Ming emperor was an offer that they could not refuse.").
245. Id. at 4-11.
246. See id. at 5-6 (discussing various motivations for the launch of the Treasureships, including to search for a deposed emperor, to protect against invasion by the army
of Timur, to suppress pirates, to cultivate goodwill and embrace of the Middle Kingdom,
and to promote commerce or impose vassalage).
247. Id. at 8.
248. See id. at 12.
249. BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA-THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA 26 (2014).
250. Id. at 28.
251. AUSTIN, supra note 59, at 38.
252. Id. at 37.
253. Michael Flecker, Early Voyaging in the South China Sea: Implications on Territorial
Claims 48 (Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre Working Paper No. 19, 2015), https://www.iseas
.edu.sg/images/pdf/nscwpsl9-early-voyaging-south china sea.implicationsterritorial
_claims.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ASU-R7ZD].
254. Id. at 44.

255. See

HAYTON,

supra note 26, at xvii (2014) (referencing

ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

CHINA SEA

(1982)).

(1976); and

DIETER HEINZING, DISPUTED

MARwYN SAMUELS, CONTEST FOR THE SOUTH
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tifying China's takeover of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in
1974.256 Journalist Bill Hayton argues that reliance on this limited scholarship "frame[s] the entire debate about the South China Sea;"' 2 5 7 that China

had no discernable interest in the South China Sea before 1909, making its
claim modern, not ancient;258 that the claim arose in response to domestic
political crises affecting the Qing Dynasty in 1909; that Chinese knowledge about the sea was minimal and confused until the early 1930s (conflating, for example, the Paracels with the Spratlys while transliterating
British cartographic charts, errors included), 25 9 and that a national sentiment did not take hold until France annexed the Paracels in 1933.260
Indeed, the first official Chinese presence in the Spratlys occurred on
December 12, 1946 with the ROC Taiping landing party. 26 1
In the Eritreav. Yemen Arbitration, the Tribunal conducted a similarly
forestalled search for effectivites to decide a territorial dispute over islands
in the Red Sea. 2 62 Both sides presented extensive evidence; Eritrea traced
its claim to the chain of title beginning with the Italian colonization of its
mainland in the latter nineteenth century, 26 3 while Yemen pointed to maps
of the Bilad el-Yemen (realm of Yemen) rule dating to the sixth century, and
declarations of the Imam of Yemen and third states. 2 64 The Tribunal
rejected the idea that the uninhabited islands were within historic waters;
as long as the colonial situation prevailed, neither party "was in a position
to demonstrate any kind of historic title that could serve as a sufficient
basis to confirm sovereignty over any of the disputed islands. '265 "In the
end, neither party [was] able to persuade the Tribunal that the history of
the matter reveals the juridical existence of an historic title, or of historic
titles, of such long-established, continuous and definitive lineage to these
particular islands, islets and rocks as would be a sufficient basis for the
Tribunal's decision. '2 66 Instead, the openness of the Red Sea for fishing
and "unrestricted traffic from one side to the other" created "a sort of 'ser256. See id. (noting three articles published by the Chinese Communist Party following the Chinese invasion of the Paracel Islands in 1974); LEE LAI To, CHINA AND THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA DIALOGUES 13 (1999) (discussing the Chinese eviction of the South
Vietnamese from the Paracels); see also Hayton, supra note 225 (noting undue reliance
by foundational papers on the South China Sea dispute on Chinese media articles).
257. HAYTON, supra note 26, at xvii (2014).
258. Bill Hayton, The Modern Origins of China's South China Sea Claim, CSIS (Sep. 22,
2016) (video: 30:19 mark), https://www.youtube.com/watch.-egMHf6fNbzA [https://
perma.cc/J3P6-B7PP].
259. Bill Hayton, Who Owns the South China Sea? COMMONWEALTH CLUB (Aug. 26,
2016), (video: 21:42-2:22 mark) (discussing Chinese cartographic transliterations and
errors).
260. Hayton, supra note 259, at 21:24 mark.
261. Id. at 29:37 mark.
262. In re Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea v. Yemen), Reports
of International Arbitral Awards XXII, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of
the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen 91 209-332 (1998).
263. Id.li 13-14.
264. Id. 31.
265. Id. l 125.
266. Id. l 449.
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vitude internationale'falling short of territorial sovereignty" but providing a
"legal basis for maintaining certain aspects of a res communis that has
existed for centuries for the benefit of the populations on both sides of the
Red Sea. ' 2 67 In the Gulf of Fonseca Case, the ICJ Chamber determined that
a similar condominium-like arrangement prevailed over the waters of the
Gulf resulting in a curious threefold sovereignty arrangement among El
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 26 8 The Chamber traced this coparcener arrangement to the Central American Court of Justice's 1917 conclusion, which the Chamber affirmed, that Spanish imperial predecessors had
"claimed and exercised continuous and peaceful sovereignty over the
waters of the Gulf, without serious... contestation" for nearly three centuries, 2 69 making the three Central American states beneficiaries of a seam270
The Chamber's grasp of
less conveyance from the Spanish Crown.
27 1
Its more central objectives may
history may not have been convincing.
have been to quiet title over disputed waters, avoid the sudden appearance
of terra nullius (in this case mare nullius) arguments, and extrapolate features of uti possidetis (as you possess, so you may possess) from its territorial and colonial confines, while also applying its teachings seaward to
avoid a dispute over ownership of the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca, and
paving the way for a smooth transition from imperial rule to the post-colonial rule of emerging statecraft. 2 72 The judgment distorted Spanish impe273
invented
rial rule over the waters of the South Sea (Pacific) as placid,
27 4
and applied the
and imposed the concept of the pluri-state bay,
maligned concept of condominium 2 75 against the express claims of one of
the parties,

276

27
thereby forcing a pelagic cohabitation of perfect equality

7

among rivals. It also problematized the United States Navy's designs of
securing a Pacific naval station to protect the corridor leading to the newly
267. Id. 126.
268. Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 351, 607-608 418.
269. Id. at 589 9 385.
270. Id. (discussing the transfer of sovereign rights to the Gulf of Fonseca as an undifferentiated single-state bay from the Spanish Crown to the Federal Republic of Central
America, which had the three Central American states as members).
271. See Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 L.CJ. Rep. at 752 79 36-37 (Diss. Op. Judge
Oda) (contesting the majority's opinion that the Gulf of Fonseca is an historic bay and
the historical grounds supporting proof that Imperial Spain or any of the parties had
control of the sea-waters off Central America).
272. Christopher R. Rossi, Jura Novit Curia? Condominium in the Gulf of Fonseca and
the "Local Illusion" of a Pluri-State Bay, 37 Hous. J. INT'L L. 793, 814 (2015).
273. See id. at 830-35 (questioning the Chamber's conclusion about the placid waters
of the bay).
274. Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. at 733 1 2 (Oda, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
concept of a "pluri-State bay" . .. has no existence as a legal institution.").
275. See, e.g., Peter Schneider, Condominium, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNAFIONAL LAW 732, 734 (Rudolf L. Bernhardt ed., 1992) (referring to condominium

arrangements as "incompatible" with modern international law).
276. Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 I.CJ. Rep. at 379 1 26 (7)(summarizing Nicaragua's
position that "[n]o regime of condominium exists in the Gulf of Fonseca or any part
thereof.").
277. Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 I.CJ. Rep. at 602 c9407.
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constructed Panama Canal. 2 78 However, it created a solution desirable to
the three Central American states to the extent that it alienated to them
control over the waters vis-a-vis the rest of the world-leaving El Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua to invent their own course of dealing over their
new-found joint ownership of Fonseca's closed waters. 2 79
II.

Sovereignty ad Absurdum: Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome Revisited

Given the Award in the South China Sea Arbitration, such a condominium solution seems remote given the Award in the South China Sea Arbitra280
tion, again for the simple reason that the South China Sea is not a bay.
The dogma of freedom of the seas prevails, but not perhaps aligned with
the liberal Grotian-inspired archetype that has been proclaimed as historically victorious. 28 1 China's ongoing attempt to establish its own kind of
mare nostrum with the vagaries of the U-shaped line has generated figurative as well as literal speculation about connecting its dots and dashes.
There is little sense in China seeking to interfere with the high seas freedom of navigation-as related to trade. China's economy is exportdriven, 28 2 and threats to navigation for commercial shipping would damage Beijing's vital interests. 283 A dispute does exist about the activities permitted under the freedom of navigation guarantee within the EEZ of
another nation. 28 4 The U.S. Navy asserts an unimpeded freedom of navigation and overflight, 28 5 meaning military vessels and aircraft encounter
278. See George A. Finch, The Treaty with NicaraguaGranting Canal and Other Rights
to the United States, 10 AM.J. INT'L L. 344, 347 (1916) (noting the strategic importance of
a naval station in Fonseca's waters to protect the western terminus of the Panama
Canal).
279. See Rossi, supra note 272, at 826-31.
280. Supra note 114 and accompanying text.
281. See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions General
Course, 216 (IV) RECUEIL DES COURS 106 (1989) (noting that Grotius' mare liberum argument prevailed over Selden's mare nostrum argument).
282. See Nicholas Bloom et al., Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese
Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity, 83 REV. ECON. STUD. 87, 87 (2016) (noting
Chinese exports grew by over fifteen percent per year for over twenty years leading up to
the 2007-2009 recession).
283. Gregory Poling, US Interests in the South China Sea: International Law and Peaceful Dispute Resolution, in POWER, LAw, AND MARITIME ORDER IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 61,
64 (Tran Truong Thuy & Le Thuy Trang eds., 2015).
284. See generally George V. Galdorisi & Alan G. Kaufman, Military Activities in the
Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 CAL. W. INT'L
LJ. 253-302 (2001-2002) (discussing military activities in the EEZ). The authors considered the problem one of the "least well addressed" areas of the Law UNCLOS, which
they claim particularly affects enclosed seas such as the Baltic, Black and South China
Seas, as well as the Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Okhotsk. Id. at 254.
285. Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on E. Asian & Pac. Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. (2009),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 11shrg53022/html/CHRG-111shrg53022.htm
(statement of Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington,
DC) ("[W]e reject any nation's attempt to place limits on the exercise of high seas freedoms within an exclusive economic zone") [https://perma.cc/F35J-9LS7].
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no restrictions for purposes of transiting, surveilling, engaging in reconnaissance activities in the EEZ. 28 6 China maintains that foreign military
28 7
vessels operating in the EEZ are subject to Chinese jurisdiction.
UNCLOS Article 58 (3) requires that states exercise "due regard" to the
rights and duties of coastal states in the EEZ; 288 Article 88 reserves the
high seas for peaceful purposes; 289 Article 301 mandates that states refrain
from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state 2 9 0-provisions China interprets as precluding
military surveillance and reconnaissance in the EEZ without coastal state
permission. 29 1 Dangerous encounters between the Chinese and Americans have taken place, 292 but China's U-shaped line incorporates more sea
space than an aggregation of imaginary insular EEZs and brings into question why China would imperil regional stability among all other littoral
powers of the South and East China Seas over a latent bilateral security
dispute with the United States?
China's timing is perplexing, and bears elements of a self-inflicted policy dilemma contrasting sovereignty and security interests. 293 Construed
other than as a probe, its actions may indicate increasing designs over the
natural resources of the South China Sea, 2 94 and/or a re-directed role for
China as an ascending worldwide economic and military power. In 2013,
China initiated an ambitious four trillion dollar plan to unite dozens of
economies of Eurasia and East Africa through a series of infrastructure
investments known as the Belt and Road Initiative (also known as One Belt,
One Road). 2 95 This initiative amounts to China's third attempt in three
286. UNCLOS art. 58, 111.
287. Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on E. Asian & Pac. Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Peter Dutton, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S.
Naval War College, Washington, DC).
288. UNCLOS art. 58, 7 3.
289. UNCLOS art. 88.
290. UNCLOS art. 301.
291. See RANE & LE MI"RE, supra note 100, at 51 n.4 (2013) (noting China's opposition to military surveillance in the EEZ).

292. See

RONALD O'ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

R42784,

MARITIME TERRITORIAL

AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEz) DisPuTEs INVOLVING CHINA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

12 (2016) (detailing eight incidences between 2001 and 2016 involving activities of U.S.
military forces operating within China's EEZ). Perhaps the two most reported incidents
involved the April 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft approximately seventy miles off China's island province of Hainan, and the March 2009 interruption of U.S.N.S. Impeccable's survey operations, approximately in the same area. See
Peter Dutton, Introduction, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ, supra note 234, at 1, 2.
293. Jian Zhang, China's South China Sea Policy: Evolution, Claims and Challenges, in
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTE, supra note 2, at 60, 73 (2015).

294. See Keyuan Zou, The South China Sea, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
THE SEA 626, 628 (Donald R. Rothwell et al., eds., 2015) (noting descriptions of the
mineral reserves of the South China Sea as a second "Persian Gulf," although noting less
optimistic estimates outside China, as well).
295. Gal Luft, China's InfrastructurePlay: Why Washington Should Accept the New Silk
Road, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 68-69 (2016). See generally Zeng Lingliang, ConceptualAnalysis of China's Belt and Road Initiative: A Road towards a Regional Community of Common
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millennia to project its economic power westward. 29 6 The proposal combines a series of land-based economic corridors (the Silk Road Economic
Belt) with the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road, which connects the
South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. 29 7 Construed as the antechamber to the greater Indian Ocean, the South China
Sea may become China's naval footprint in a possibly decades-long drama
for dominance, much like how the Greater Caribbean provided the United
States with a seafaring foothold for hemispheric and, soon thereafter,
world dominance. 2 98 Employing a so-called "cabbage strategy" of wrapping individual features of the South China Sea in layers of incremental
appropriation, 299 China's attempt to "further consolidate claims" now
30 0
intensifies through law enforcement patrols within the U-shaped line.
A. Sovereignty ad Absurdum and Freedom of the Seas
The South China Sea Arbitrationhas generated a debate over the Tribunal's rejection of effectivites supporting Chinese dominium over the South
China Sea. But a more turbulent discussion awaits consideration, one that
has long weakened the international project to secure the open, rule-based,
reciprocal (cooperative), institutional liberal order on which the freedom of
the seas is based. 30 1 This discussion involves the less than complete
embrace of freedom of the seas even among some of liberal internationalism's ardent supporters-a syndromic consequence of Treaty of Tordesillas
thinking, now undergoing Sinicized interpretation.
Freedom of the seas is one of the great shibboleths of liberal international law. It dates to the grand seventeenth century debate between Hugo
Grotius and John Selden over free versus closed seas (mare liberum v. mare
clausum), with increasing recognition of Vazquez de Menchaca's influence
on Grotius 30 2 and ripostes to Grotius' view from other publicists such as
Destiny, 15 CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 517-41 (2016) (assessing challenges facing the implementation of the project).
296. See id. at 68 (citing also the Han Dynasty's establishment of the ancient Silk
Road in the second century B.C. and the voyages of Admiral Zheng during the Ming
Dynasty).

297. See id. at 69; see also Tian Shaohui, Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative,
XINHUANET (Mar. 28, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/

c_134105435.htm [https://perma.cc/S8YX-BX5J].
298. Robert Kaplan, China's Budding Ocean Empire, NAT'L INT. (June 5, 2014), http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-budding-ocean-empire- 10603 [https://perma.cc/
P9SW-S57F].

299. See Harry Kazianis, China's Expanding Cabbage Strategy, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 29,
2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-expanding-cabbage-strategy/ [https://
perma.cc/99WA-S7VX].
300. Zou, supra note 294, at 636.
301. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEvIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 18 (2011) (describing attributes of the distinctive
liberal international order).
302. See David Armitage, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA at xv, xvii
(Richard Hakluyt trans., David Armitage ed., 2004) (crediting the influence of Vdzquez
de Menchaca's Controversiarumillustrium ... libri tres, 1572); M6nica Brito-Vieira, Mare
Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden's Debate on Dominion over the
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Welwood, 30 3 Freitas,30 4 and Pereira. 30 5 Mare Liberum described the
oceans as a global commons, 30 6 and in it Grotius defended the right of the
Dutch East India Company to ply Asian waters Portugal had claimed for
itself.30 7 This dogma surfaced in arguments presented by the Philippines
before the Tribunal: "from the time of Grotius through the widespread
acceptance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, international law has not preserved, admitted or accepted claims to control vast
areas of the sea in derogation of either the freedom of the seas or the rights
30
of the immediately adjacent coastal state."
Embedded in this dogma is the idea that Grotius began the process of
decoupling the concept of ownership (dominium) from that of rule/sovereignty (imperium), thus quieting disputes over control of vast swaths of the
sea. He has been portrayed as appearing at the cusp of a new age, an age
stylized by Richard Falk and many others as the arrival of international
law's Grotian Moment, 30 9 which then transformed into the eponymous
GrotianTradition. 310 This Moment and Tradition represent the conceptual
Seas, 64 J. HIST. IDEAS 361, 362 (2003) (noting Grotius cited Vazquez de Menchaca seventy-four times in De Jure Praeda).
303. See, e.g., WILLIAM WELWOOD, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF ALL SEA-LAwEs Tit. XXVII
(Colin Mackenzie ed., 2011);

WILLIAM WELWOOD, DE

DoMINIo MARs (1615) (rejecting

Grotius' claim that the seas were indivisible, particularly regarding coastal state
authority).

304. See, e.g., SERAPHIM DE FREITAS, DE IUSTO IMPERIo LUSITANORUM AsIATICO (1625)
(defending Portuguese interests in Asia while discounting free trade and navigation as
parts of the law of nations); C.H. Alexandrowicz, Freitas versus Grotius, 35 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 162 (1959) (discussing Freitas' De Justo Imperio Lusitanorum Asiatico).
305. See, e.g., JuAN DE SOLORZANO PERE1RA, DE INDIARUM IURE (1672). International
legal historian and antiquarian Edward Gordon noted that Pereira's attack against Grotius was regarded by Spanish scholars as the most systematic juridical formulation of
Spanish and Portuguese seventeenth century claims based on prescription and Roman
and customary law, but that it has been scarcely studied by English-speaking scholars.
See Edward Gordon, Freedom of the Seas: Part 4, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR.
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://library.law.yale.edu/news/freedom-seas-part-4 [https://perma
.cc/XE3L-XTDV].
306. GRoTius, MARE LIBERUM, supra note 231, at XIV-XV (enjoining proprietary
claims over the oceans).
307. Id.
308. Final Transcript Day 1-Merits Hearing at 63, In re South China Sea Arbitration,
PCA Case Repository 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/1547 (testimony of Professor Oxman) [[https://perma.cc/D8DG-9D7H].
309. Falk coined the phrase in 1985. See Richard Falk, The Grotian Moment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, &
Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., 1985). For expressions of the idea of the Grotian Moment, see,
e.g., MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS (2014); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Role of
International Law in the Twenty-First Century: A Grotian Moment, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ.
1609 (1995); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood,
39 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 209 (2011); John T. Parry, What is the Grotian Tradition in
International Law?, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 299 (2014); Christopher Weeramantry, The
Grotius Lecture Series: Opening Tribute To Hugo Grotius, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1516
(1999).
310. The Grotian Tradition in international law and relations is among the most sustaining and powerful perspectives. The tradition dates to enthusiastic portrayals of Grotius. See, e.g., CORNELIS VAN VOLLENHOVEN, DE DRIE TREDEN VAN HET VOLKENRECHT
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birth certificate for transformative liberal internationalism and the
advancement of the doctrine of freedom of the seas.3 1 1 It represents the
repudiation of the Treaty of Tordesillas syndrome and the ending of closed
seas mentality.
The Treaty of Tordesillas divided the world in two. 3 1 2 Based on the
famous fourth papal bull of Alexander VI, 3 13 itself a revision of previous
papal donations from the Spanish Borgia that were overly generous to the
Castilian Crown, 3 14 the treaty split the Atlantic approximately midway
between the Azores and the West Indies along a meridian 370 leagues west
of the Cape Verde Islands. 31 5 Criticized as a display of sovereignty ad
absurdum,316 the treaty nevertheless significantly altered history: newfound territory and peoples west and south of the meridian became property of the Castilian Crown (essentially, most of the physical and human
geography of the Americas); territory to the east-Brazil, Africa, the Indian
Ocean to Bombay, Goa, and the Spice Islands leading to the Moluccas-fell
into the realm of the Portuguese king. 3 17 Its most telling consequence
reflected super-power willingness to appropriate and divide that which
could not be seized outright. 3 18 This tendency has been displayed problematically in the history of the law of the sea, where liberalism's twin connections to freedoms of navigation and commerce have never been as
solidly or consistently upheld as supporters of the liberal ethos would like
to believe.
(1918). It is perhaps best exemplified by Hersch Lauterpacht, The GrotianTradition in
International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1946), and members of the so-called
English School of international relations. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL
SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977); MARTIN WIGHT, INTERNATIONAL

(Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter eds., 1991).
311. Kim Browne, An Equitable International Legal Framework: The Grotian Heritage,
2011 ASIA-PACrIC REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE PROCEEDINGS, http://www.themua.org/colections/items/show/1199
[https://perma.cc/CH2LTD78].
312. Although not explicitly stated in 1494, historian Charles Gibson noted "the
assumption commonly made in Spain ...was that the Tordesillas line should be projected around the world into the Asiatic hemisphere." The matter would have been
understood as well in terms of Portuguese interests because of its control over the Spice
Islands, of tremendous commercial value in European trade. GIBSON, supra note 97, at
18.
313. Dudum siquidem, September 26, 1493.
314. Dudum siquidem modified earlier papal donations issued between May and September 1492 following Columbus' first voyage to the New World. See C.H. HARING, THE
SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 9 (1947) (noting donations to Spain over all islands and
mainland of the Americas toward the Indies). Portuguese diplomats successfully lobbied in favor of a revision, leading to Dudum siquidem, which pushed the divide another
two hundred and seventy leagues west (accounting for Portugal's colonial control over
Brazil). See Hal Langfur, Colonial Brazil (1500-1822), in A COMPANION TO LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY 89, 89 (Thomas H. Holloway ed., 2008).
315. See GIBSON, supra note 97, at 17.
THEORY: THE THREE TRADITIONS

316.

CHRISTOPHER

R.

ROSSI, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL TEMPTATION: THE GROTIAN

(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
317. Philip E. Steinberg, Lines of Division, Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World
Ocean, 89 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 254, 255 (1999).
318. Id.
TENDENCY
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Indeed, Hugo Grotius' reworking of a chapter of a previously unpublished work, 3 1 9 which famously resulted in Mare Liberum, never achieved
unassailable status as a universal rule of law. The idea was controversial3 in
21
its own time,3 20 amply contested by centuries of prior state practice,
and is now anachronistically praised for its novelty and logic. 3 2 2 Liberal

internationalists elevated freedom of the seas to a position of primacy,
3 23
placing it as a keystone in the foundation myth of the Grotian Tradition.
China's illiberal challenge to the Grotian perspective may not be surprising, but neither should be the historical ambivalence of western liberalism's upholding of high seas freedoms. An irony of the modem age is
that its ideational embrace has never been complete, nor uniformly
deemed as desirable. International law has never come completely to
terms with the decoupling of ownership (dominium) from sovereignty
(imperium) as the project of liberal internationalism demands and as the
as
tragedy of the Commons suggests. The Treaty of Tordesillas, as absurd324
it appears in the modem mind, never paid that decoupling much mind,
but it is less of an anachronism than modernists hold. This western ambivalence serves as a basis for China's expansive claims, a variant of tu quoque
(you did it, too) thinking only removed from the battlefield and applied to
expansive claims over the oceans.3 2 5 This ambivalence may ultimately
shape the practical long-term consequence of the Tribunal's Award.
B. The Reassessment of Grotius' Mare Liberum
Cracks in the Grotian conception of freedom of the seas have gained
more scholarly attention. Grotius and his luminous tradition have undergone recent and critical reassessments. 32 6 Only a selection of his body of
work fits into liberalism's mold of advancing freedom of the seas.
1.

Doctrinal Criticisms

Edward Keene argues that the Grotian tradition's narrow perspective
319. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS (1604-1606).

See

generally Robert Fruin, An Unpublished Work of Hugo Grotius's, 5 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA

13 (1925).
320. For a discussion of the predominance of the mare clausum idea during the western medieval period, see generally Bo Johnson Theutenberg, Mare Clausum et Mare
Liberum, 37 ARcTIC 481 (1984).
321. See Christopher R. Rossi, A ParticularKind of Dominium: The Grotian 'Tendency'
and the Global Commons in a Time of High Arctic Change, 11 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1,

16-19 (2015).
322. See, e.g., PETER HAGGENMACHER, GROTIUs ET LA DOCTRINE DE LA GUERRE JUsTE

(1983).
323. See DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 9-10
(2013) (noting generally Grotian foundation myths of early modernity advanced by
ideologically-minded communities of international lawyers and others).
324. See Steinberg, supra note 317, at 256-57.
325. Sienho Yee, The South China Sea Arbitration: Potential jurisdictional Obstacles or

Objections, 13 CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 663, 674 (2014).
326. Paul Laurence Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the General Assembly
Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TUL. L. REV. 492, 492, 496 (1979).
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developed out of the imaginarium of the European colonial world. 32

7

Julia

Martine Van Ittersum labeled him an apologist for the corporate interests of
the Dutch East India Company. 32 8 Peter Borschberg criticized him for
cloaking freedoms of navigation and commerce (the jus navigandi and the
jus mercandi) in a language that merely substituted Dutch hegemonic con3 29
trol over the commons for the preceding imperial Luso-Spanish rule.
Grotius' peculiar notion of divided sovereignty conferred a public right of
war on a comprador class of private agents sailing on Europe's periphery
where no judge existed and no judgment could be given. 330 This view,
according to Karl Zemanek, set Grotius apart from almost all other writers
of the early modem age. 3 3 ' It linked this proto-liberal ethic of war to the
extended interests of the dominant power, ironically encased in a small
pamphlet devoted to making the seas free. 33 2 Taken together, Grotius'
work can be read as rhetorically decoupling dominium and imperium, or as
substituting the corporate and colonial interests of the emerging United
Provinces as dominus for the waning power of the Portuguese. 3 33 The
global systems administered by Britain in the nineteenth century and the
United States in the twentieth century grappled with liberal order building
33 4
and its mixture of imperial command and liberal consent structures.
Should expectations for China in the twenty-first century be more
demanding?
Critics of China's South China Sea policy note illiberal parallels with
eighteen and nineteenth century imperialist expansions of western powers, 335 but the similarities reach back to the seventeenth century, and
extend into the twenty-first century as well.3 36 Concentration on princi-

ples of navigation and commerce has coopted the discussion about the his327. See EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM AND
ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 38 (2002) (noting the Grotian Tradition's narrow and twisted
perspective).
328. MARTINE

JULIA VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS,

NATURAL

1595-1615, 488
(2006) (labeling Grotius an apologist for the Dutch East India Company).
RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES,

329.

PETER BORSCHBERG, HUGO GROTIUS, THE PORTUGUESE AND FREE TRADE IN THE EAST

INDIES 102 (2010) (questioning Grotius' interpretation of free trade).
330. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM, supra note 231, at 153 (specifically "where a judgment
cannot be given").
331. Karl Zemanek, Was Hugo Grotius Really in Favor of the Freedom of the Seas?, 1 J.
HIST. INT'L L. 46, 50 n.7 (1999) (arguing that with this view, Grotius almost stands alone
among writers of the early modem age).

332. See CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSi, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL TEMPTATION: THE GROTIAN TENDENCY (forthcoming) (referencing partially the view of Karma Nabulsi).
333. See M6nica Brito Vieira, Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and
Selden's Debate on Dominion over the Seas, 64 J. HIST. IDEAS 361, 369, 371 (2003).
334. Ikenberry discusses the "monstrous disconnect" (quoting Gary Bass) between
growing nineteenth century liberalism in Britain and the brutish, illiberal authoritarianism of its Empire, as well as the tensions in the administration of the Pax Americana in
the twentieth century-as the title to his book, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN, implies. See
IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN 16 n. 17 ("monstrous disconnect"), and accompanying
text 16-27.
335. See, e.g., Malik, supra note 56.
336. Id.

2017

Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome

torical parallels. 33 7 The commercial element appears to be a non-issue in
the South China Sea, and the navigational element presents a sticking
point from a military perspective. But like the Tordesillas divided the
world between the Spanish and Portuguese, the South China Sea dispute
involves the hegemonic control over the dwindling commons and the fast
emerging resources contained therein. 3 38 This mindset accentuates
unresolved tensions embedded in UNCLOS involving the extension of rules
regarding resource ownership while limiting coastal state sovereignty and
33 9
jurisdiction over navigation.
Less critical or more sympathetic twentieth century appraisals of Grotius' dogma of freedom of the seas also grapple with this tension. In the
twentieth century, the freedom of the seas concept was largely reworked to
emphasize innocent or inoffensive use. 34 0

Tullio Scovazzi identified the

progressive weakening of the unrestricted freedom of the seas principle
and the reworking of the freedom of the seas principle as the main trend of
the second half of the twentieth century. 3 4 1 This emerging freedom of the
seas principle took the form of successive coastal zone extensions over the
territorial sea, the continental shelf, the EEZ, and the Common Heritage of
Mankind zone applicable to the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 34 2 These restrictions on the freedom of the seas principle provided an enhanced regime structure to counter offensive encroachments on
the freedom of the seas principle. 3 43 But the regime structure, despite its
significance, 34 4 has never been water-tight.
Prominent authorities such as Georges Scelle and Wolfgang Friedmann sounded early postwar concerns that-absent an effective regime
structure-the historical era of mare liberum would transpose into consolidated claims of sovereignty or vested coastal state interests over dwindling
open sea space. 3 4 5 Others also described the radical postwar movement
337. See Lee Yong Leng, Offshore Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia, 10J. SOUTHEAST
ASIAN STUD. 175, 176, 189 (1979).

338. Id. at 176.
339. See Ivan Shearer, The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME
JURISDICTION 51, 51 (Clive Scholfield et al. eds., 2014).

340. Tullio Scovazzi, The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind and the Genetic
Resources of the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 14 AGENDA INTERNACIONAL 11, 11-12 (2007).

341. Id. at 12.
342. Id. at 11; Wolfgang Friedmann, Selden Redivivus- Towards a Partitionof the Seas?,
65 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757 (1971).

343. Video: Audiovisual Library of International Law Lecture Series: The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Beyond 7:38-8:23 (Tullio Scovazzi, U.N.
Office of Legal Affairs Apr. 29, 2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/ls/Scovazzi LS-video_1
.html [https://perma.cc/5QDG-4EEH].
344. See Oceans: The Lifeline of Our Planet: Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 20 Years of Law and Order on the Oceans and Seas (1982-2002),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/convention-2Oyears/oceansthelifeline (calling UNCLOS "[olne of the most significant legal instruments of the 20th
Century") [https://perma.cc/FCB8-E2TP].
345. Friedmann, supra note 342, at 757-58, 763 (explaining the immediacy of the
need for an effective international treaty to prevent the consolidation of vested coastal
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toward closed seas. 34 6 Cecil Hurst located the closed seas movement's

beginnings in the 1945 Truman Proclamations, calling them sovereignty by
another name. 34 7 Maritime superpower the United States' sovereignty

claims stimulated a multiplication of unilateral claims by lesser powers. 34 8
Chile and Peru quickly followed suit with two-hundred-mile national sovereignty projections over submarine areas, 3 49 based, in part, on the 1939
Panama Declaration. This declaration proclaimed that American republics
had an inherent right to exclude non-American belligerents from a broad
three-hundred-mile ocean area extending from American coasts. 3 50 The
zone impeded the resupply of Axis ships in South American ports, 3 5 1 and
subjected transit through the Panama Canal to more stringent regulation. 35 2 Ten Arab states followed in 1949 and by the early 1970s, a succession of instruments-the Montevideo Declaration (1970), the Lima
Declaration (1970), the Santo Domingo Declaration (1972), the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (1971), the Yaound Conclusions
(1972), the Addis Ababa Declaration (1973)-pronounced the right of
coastal states to establish exclusive resource zones beyond the territorial
53
sea. 3
Oxman noted the geographic scope and speed of coastal state territorial assertions seaward placed them on par with "the most ambitious conquerors in human history. '3 54 Malcolm Shaw observed that the
state interests);

see GEORGES

SCELLE PLATEAU CONTINENTAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [Con-

tinental Platform of International Law] 762 (1955).

346. See Hubert Thierry, The Thought of Georges Scelle, 1 EUR. J. INr'L L. 193, 207-08
(1990); R.Y. Jennings, A Changing International Law of the Sea, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 32, 34
(1972); Cecil Hurst, The Continental Shelf, 34 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS Soc'Y 153
(1948); Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376
(1950); see also L.D.M. Nelson, The PatrimonialSea, 22 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 668, 669.
347. Hurst, supra note 346, at 161 (interpreting the distinction between the Truman
Proclamation's exercise of exclusive control and sovereignty as "so small as to be little
more than a question of name").
348. Gemma Andreone, The Exclusive Economic Zone, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw OF THE SEA, supra note 294, 159, 160-61.
349. Declaration on the Maritime Zone Signed at Santiago on 18 August 1952, Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru, Aug. 18, 1952, 1006 U.N.T.S 326; S.N. Nandan, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Historical Perspective,FAO CORP. DOCUMENT DEPOSITORY (last visited Feb.
27, 2017), http://www.fao.org/docrep/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm [https://perma.cc/Y3HJBTB5]. Five years later, Ecuador joined with Chile and Peru to enact the Santiago Declaration, which was the first international legal agreement to proclaim the two-hundredmile limit. See Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Declaration on the Maritime Zone (No. 14758).
Signed at Santiago on 18 August 1952, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%201006/volume-1006--14758-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2KP-KWVX].
350. Letter from Sumner Welles Am Del., to Cordell Hull, Sec'y of State (Oct. 3, 1939)
at 36-38 in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1939, THE
AMERICAN REPUBLICS VOL. V (Matilda F. Axton et al. 1957). Nandan, supra note 349.
351. Nandan, supra note 349.
352. ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 233 n. 80 (1955)
(discussing U.S. Executive Orders proclaimed on September 5, 1939, restricting belligerent passage or stay in the waters of the Canal Zone).
353. See Nandan, supra note 349.
354. Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM J.
INT'L L. 830, 832 (2006).
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enlargement of coastal state jurisdiction reflected an attitudinal change
stimulated by resources pursuits beyond the territorial sea and leading to
ever greater claims over the high seas. 3 55 The novel introduction of the

EEZ in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention brought upwards of thirty
356
percent of the world's maritime surface within coastal state control.
This spatial reconfiguration amounted to an area of Treaty of Tordesillaslike proportion-an almost "inconceivable" extension of coastal state jurisdiction over ocean space falling in the interstice between mare liberum and
mare clausum.35 7 This sui generis regime, geographically located between

the territorial sea and the high sea, developed in the shadow of hegemonic
state practice, but it ambiguously balanced the interests of Latin American
states, which sought to invest in it a residual territorial sea character, and
the rights of maritime powers, which wanted the zone to be part of the high
seas, provided "that coastal states had the sovereign right to explore and
exploit the natural resources in the zone. '' 358 Retailed to non-coastal states
and developing countries as a "package deal," 3 59 the astonishing jurisdictional allotments UNCLOS accorded to coastal states were to be offset principally by the revolutionary concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind
as applied to the deep seabed mining provisions of the Convention. 360 The
International Seabed Authority administered the area beyond the scope of
national jurisdiction for the benefit of all countries. 3 6 1 The principles
underpinning the Common Heritage concept emphasized redistributive
justice in the form of shared resources allocation and technology transfers
to the developing world.3 62 Consensus failed, due directly to the United
States' hegemonic rejection of such "a dramatic step toward world government." 36 3 Other important developed states followed and either rejected or
355. MALCOLM SHAW INTERNuATIONAL LAw 402 (7th ed., 2014).
356. See Galdorisi & Kaufman, supra note 284, at 254 (estimating the EEZ removed

"[thirty to thirty-six percent] of the world's oceans from waters traditionally considered
high seas"); see also Stephen C. Nemeth et al., Ruling the Sea: Managing Maritime Conflicts Through UNCLOS and Exclusive Economic Zones, 40 INT'L INTERACTIONS 711, 714
(noting the regime of the EEZ extended worldwide coastal state jurisdiction over thirtyeight square nautical miles of ocean space); ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE CLAIMS: AN ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 5 (1986) (calculating the extent of
the world's aggregate EEZs at almost thirty-two million square nautical miles).
357. DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TiM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA 88
(2d ed. 2016).
358. Robert Beckman & Tara Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections After 30 Years 6
(LOSI Conference Paper, 2012).
359. See Alan Beesley, The Negotiating Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed Countries as Partners-APattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?,
46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 185 (calling the package deal concept "fundamental to
the Conference from its outset").
360. See Scovazzi, supra note 343, at 13:08 mark.
361. See UNCLOS arts. 136-37, 156-58.
362. See David Armstrong, Law, Justice and the Idea of a World Society, 75 ROYAL INST.
IN'L AFF. 551-56 (1999) (discussing the Common Heritage of Mankind idea its redistributive implications as applied to the deep seabed mining provisions of UNCLOS).
363. William P. Clark & Edwin Meese III, Reagan and the Law of the Sea, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/10/reagan-and-the-law-of-the-sea [https://perma.cc/CKH9-HX4E].

274

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 50

abstained from the Convention, forcing a 1994 Implementation Agreement
that commodified the Common Heritage idea to bring it and the International Seabed Authority in line with market-based principles. 364 The now
moribund Common Heritage concept as applied to the law of the sea
embraced the separation of ownership (dominium) questions from ruledirectives (imperium).3 65 Against this backdrop-a backdrop that allows
the freedom limiting regime structure of UNCLOS to be undermined by the
prime thalassocratic power that is best able to contribute to its operation,
China now begins to push forth its own interpretation of the pliable bal3 66
Its objective seeks to preserve
ance between dominium and imperium.

the freedom of navigation for inoffensive uses while securing for itself
future security and economic interests with regard to resource
extraction.367
More worrying consequences await the application of the embattled
UNCLOS to a new set of grey areas, contributing to fierce competitions
over newly emerging resources. 368 These territorial disputes in the sea are
well within the peripheral vision of China. 36 9 Contemporary scrambles
are underway at the beginning of the twenty-first century, one in the High
Arctic, 3 70 the other spanning the globe, but including the High Arctic, and
37 1
Taken
stretching into the outer reaches of the continental shelf.
364. GA Res. 48/263 (July 28, 1994); see David H. Anderson, Resolution and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of PartXI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea:
A General Assessment, 55 ZAORV 275, 278-79 (1995) (discussing the Implementation
Agreement and its key passages the market-based changes Part XI).
365. UNCLOS, art. 137.
366. Marina Tsaribas, What Does the Nine-Dash Line Actually Mean?, THE DIPLOMAT

(June 2, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/what-does-the-nine-dash-line-actuallymean/ [https://perma.cc/3T4E-8C8N].
367. Id.
368. Tullio Treves, Part V: The Law of the Sea After UNCLOS: Open Challenges, AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT'L L., U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAiRs (undated) (video: 19:55-22:05 mark),

http://Iegal.un.org/avl/ls/Treves LS video_2_5.html [https://perma.cc/6XMJ-GTQR].
369. Bree Feng, China Looks North: Carving Out a Role in the Arctic, AsIA PACIFIC

FouND. CAN. (2016), https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/china-looks-northcarving-out-role-arctic [https://perma.cc/8PYQ-2X9Y].
370. The "High Arctic" region is a term used to distinguish the colder climates of the
Arctic, which are closer to the North Pole, than the relatively warmer environs of the
lower or subarctic regions. Definitions of the Arctic region differ, but not materially for
purposes of this paper. The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA), 15 U.S.C. § 4111
(1984) defines the Arctic as "all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic
Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas, including the
Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain." A
helpful map of this area can be found at: Allison Gaylord, Arctic Boundary as Defined by
the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA), USARC - UNITED STATES ARCTIC RESEARCH COM-

MISSION (May 27, 2009), https://storage.googleapis.com/arcticgov-static/publications/
maps/ARPA Polar 150dpi.jpg [https://perma.cc/VC4Z-PCRC]. For the definition and
map of the Arctic used by a working group of the Arctic Council, the eight-member
group formed in 1996 for purposes of promoting cooperation in the region, adopted by
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), see GeographicalCoverage,
AMPAP, http://www.amap.no/about/geographical-coverage [https://perma.cc/33QW9BS8].
371. Treves, supra note 368.
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together, these scrambles have been called "one of the biggest territorial
grabs in history," 37 2 and they threaten the encroachment on remaining
unsecured space, as implied by the Treaty of Tordesillas more than five
hundred years ago.
2. Arctic Passageways
Rapid ice melt in the Anthropocene age makes plausible the opening
37 3
up of Arctic shipping routes linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
One route sits atop the Eurasian continent and traverses the treacherous
Northern Sea Route, part of the Northeast Passage. 3 74 Another route
snakes across the nineteen thousand islands of the Canadian Archipelagic
island chain known as the Northwest Passage. 375 Neither one of these
passages occupied much international legal attention until global climate
change made possible the prospect of turning them into Arctic commercial
highways. 3 76 But in mirror-image fashion, 3 77 Russia and Canada claim
sovereignty over these respective passageways, holding they are enclosed
waters and subject only to Canadian and Russian sovereign decisions. 37 8
Proximity to chokepoints, control over icebreaking escort services, and the
remoteness of the regions, enhance their effective control over the passageways. 37 9 Moreover, Russia's Northern Sea Route claim extends into its
EEZ, and like the Chinese claim over the integral nature of the insular features of the South China Sea, contends that the fact that "individual portions of it may pass outside of its internal waters" does not affect the
integral nature of the Northern Sea Route as an historical national transport route.3 80 Vagaries associated with Russia's sovereign claim include an
372. ScottJ. Shackelford, Was Selden Right?: The Expansion of Closed Seas and its Consequences, 47 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2011).
373. Treves, supra note 368.
374. Id.
375. See UNCLOS, art. 234.
376. Indeed, only one of UNCLOS' 320 articles and nine annexes deals with ice-covered areas. See UNCLOS art. 234.
377. See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World, 65 INT'LJ. 879-97 (2010) (noting problems of mixed messaging involving the
adversarial relationship between Canada and Russia given similar jurisdictional and economic positions in the Arctic).
378. See generally DONAT PHARAND, THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE: ARCTIC STRAITS (1984)
(discussing the Canadian view); Willy Ostreng, The Northern Sea Route and Jurisdictional
Controversy, ARCTIS (2010), http://www.arctis-search.com/Northern+Sea+Route+and+
Jurisdictional+Controversy (discussing the Russian view) [https://perma.cc/RV8EK5ZZ].
379. Simon 0. Williams, Northern Sea Route: Chokepoint Contingency, BARENTSOBSERVER (Nov. 15, 2012), http://barentsobserver.com/en/opinion/northern-sea-routechokepoint-contingency-15-11 (discussing Russian interests and advantages associated
with the development of the Northem Sea Route as a viable East-West passageway)
[https://perma.cc/L4HS-RANG]; for similar discussion involving Canada, see generally
MICHAEL BYERS, WHO OWNS THE ARCTIC?: UNDERSTANDING

SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES IN THE

(2009).
380. Christopher R. Rossi, The Northern Sea Route and the Seaward Extension of Uti
Possidetis (Juris), 83 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 476, 478 (2014).
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Arctic version of China's U-shaped line. 3 8 ' This version projects a Russian
sector theory of sovereignty over the Arctic as measured by meridians of
longitude converging at the vertex of the North Pole in pie-sliced
wedges. 3 82 Propounded in 1907 by a Canadian legislator, the idea gained
traction in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Presidium in
1926, based on a defensive desire to protect against imperialist interventions in its ambiguously described "gravitation" sector. 38 3 Uncertainty
and confusion surround the status of the sector theory in the post-Soviet
Russia, and certainly since Russia's adherence to UNCLOS; but this ambiguity has been described as "creative" and "deliberate" in terms of possibly
providing Russia with a "fall-back" plan or flexibility to amend its position, 384 presumably if its once-proud Baltic Fleet recovers from persistent
challenges since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 3 85 Russia's sector theory
implies the lingering presence of Treaty of Tordesillas syndrome, and proponents of liberal internationalism should not profess complete surprise if
they witness the theory's recrudescence in the Arctic or elsewhere in an age
of rapid polar ice melt.
3.

Continental Shelf Extensions

Articles 76-85 of UNCLOS provide for another extension of sovereign
rights. 38 6 Where the continental shelf extends beyond two hundred nautical miles, states may submit technical evidence to a special commissionthe Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)-to show
that the submerged natural prolongation of the shelf appertains to the
coastal state's land territory. 38 7 In the Arctic, this process has been
described alternatively as orderly and as wildly capricious, sparking "a
highly competitive scramble to stake claims." 38 8 Such seabed and ocean
floor could then be claimed by the coastal state, limited by one or another
technical constraint. 38 9 The five coastal states rimming the Arctic381. 0streng, supra note 378.
382. Id.

383. Id.
384. See id; see also comment of Erik Franckx, Sixth Annual CSIS South China Sea
Conference: Legal Issues and Next Steps, CSIS (July 12, 2016) (video: 1:02:35 mark),
https://www.youtube.com/watch,=YGoROYgg9Mc (linking the ambiguity of the Ushaped line to Russian sector theory in the Arctic) [https://perma.cc/574W-XKTS].
385. See Gary K. Busch, The Roots of the Russian Purge of the Baltic Fleet Admirals,
OCNUs.NET (July 15, 2016), http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Editorial-10/TheRoots-of-The-Russian-Purge-of-the-Baltic-Fleet-Admirals.shtm (noting the loss of warm
water ports in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and persistent underfunding problems for
the Baltic Fleet) [https://perma.cc/EP4N-QXNK].
386. See UNCLOS art. 76-85.
387. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics: The Continental Shelf Extension, 39 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 343, 344 (2008).
388. Id. at 343.
389. Two formulas involving bathymetric and sediment thickness formula can be
used in any combination to determine the outer limit of the extended continental shelf.
UNCLOS also provides a distance [350 nautical miles from the baseline] and depth
constraint [from the 2500 meter isobaths + 100 nm]. See About, U.S. EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF PROJECT, https://www.continentalshelf.gov/about/index.htm [https://per
ma.cc/7WET-69D4].

2017

Treaty of Tordesillas Syndrome

Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United
States-already have issued a declaration asserting their "unique position"
to act as stewards over the Arctic Ocean. 390 They have or will fashion submissions to the CLCS. 3 9 1 In February 2016, Russia alone submitted a
revised application, covering an underwater space equal to about 1.2 million square kilometers of extended continental shelf, including claims for
the Lomonosov Ridge, the Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, the Chukchi Plateau, and
more. 39 2 Aggregate untapped oil and natural gas reserves in this area yield
3 93
Denmark's
estimates approaching thirty trillion dollars in value.
extended continental shelf claim, which conflicts with Russia's claim, is
twenty times larger than Denmark. 3 94 Norway's claim extended its continental shelf by the equivalent of seven soccer fields for each of its five million people; Canada's claim equals the combined size of its three prairie
provinces, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba; and United States President Barack Obama noted the U.S. claim could extend more than six hundred nautical miles north of Alaska. 395 Although not adjacent to the Arctic
Ocean, more than eighty coastal nations worldwide likely have a continen3 96
and seventytal shelf that extends beyond two hundred nautical miles,
39 7
The United States alone
seven have filed submissions with the CLCS.
projects that its extended sovereign rights over the seafloor and subseafloor continental shelf may include at least one million square kilometers-an area about twice the size of California or half the size of the Louisiana Purchase-extending over offshore areas in the Arctic, the Atlantic East
Coast, the Bering Sea, the Pacific West Coast, the Gulf of Mexico and possi390. The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, DANISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (May 28, 2008), http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/IlulissatDeclara
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVZ9-TWDT].
391. Battle over Arctic as Russia, Norway, US, Canada,Denmark Claim it, MINA (Aug.
5, 2015), http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/27874/53/ [https://perma.cc/55LF28MC].
392. Lisbeth Kirk, Russia Re-submits Arctic Claims to UN, EUOBSERVER (Aug. 5, 2015)
https://euobserver.com/news/129834 [https://perma.cc/5YHZ-WWXK].
393. Russia Submits Revised Claims for Extending Arctic Shelf to UN, RT. (Feb. 10,
[https://perma.cc/
2016), https://www.rt.com/news/332089-russia-arctic-claim-un/
LH5N-BEJG].
394. See id.
395. See National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 1, 9, www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/doc/nat arcticstrategy.pdf, with a cover letter from President
Barack Obama dated May 10, 2013 (noting the U.S. "extended continental shelf claim in
the Arctic region could extend more than 600 nautical miles from the north coast of
Alaska.") [https://perma.cc/82FF-R47X].
396. See Canada'sExtended Continental Shelf, FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEv. CAN. (Dec.
9, 2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/continental/index.aspx?
lang=eng (estimating that eighty-five countries may have extended continental shelf
claims) [https://perma.cc/V2PP-SSUVI.
397. See Submissions, through the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph8, of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, UNITED NATIONS:
OcEANs & L. SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcsnew/commission-submissions
.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P5TS-3UMG].
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bly other areas. 3 98 "Given the size of the [U.S. extended continental shelf],
the energy, mineral, and living resources may be worth many billions if not
39 9
trillions of dollars."
Whether the current regime of international law regulating uses of
such spaces are strong enough to withstand the temptations of Treaty of
Tordesillas syndrome remain to be seen. The Treaty of Tordesillas appears
as an anachronism to the modern mind, except when viewed from the
expansive claims of powerful states seeking to assert domini control over
diminishing resources amid rapidly advancing prospects to secure them.
Liberal international lawyers regard the process as orderly and rule-regulated cartography; 400 China's embrace of the process appears more
circumspect.
Conclusion
The modern history of the law of the sea represents an attempt to
decouple dominium, or ownership over resources of the sea, from imperium, or the power to rule and establish sovereignty over the sea. UNCLOS
exists to strike that balance and to put an end to Treaty of Tordesillas syndrome, which preceded that division and melded the two concepts into an
undifferentiated power of the dominus to rule, exclude, and appropriate. 40 1
UNCLOS has been praised as an instrument that has successfully managed
that separation, as well as multiple other interests pertaining to the environment, security, and the commons. 40 2 But the separation of the right to
own emerging resources of the sea and the power to regulate access to
those resources never extinguished the uneasy relationship between
coastal and maritime powers. 40 3 While the globalizing interests of commerce and the navigation pertaining to it has helped facilitate consensus
over trade-related aspects of UNCLOS, 40 4 certainly with regard to access to
foreign emporia, large-scale appropriations of resources periodically reinforce Treaty of Tordesillas thinking, where distinctions of ownership and
sovereignty become subject to elastic interpretations of UNCLOS, and the
shifting power relations of states. Although appearing in a form different
from its fifteen-century expression, new found circumstances relating to
global climate change, or changing technology, or power relations expose
long-established tensions between coastal and maritime states, for instance
involving sovereignty claims over High Arctic passageways, continental
398. See FAQ, U.S. EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF PROJECT, https://www.continentalshelf.gov/about/index.htm [https://perma.cc/S2DA-XE35].
399. Id.
400. Henry Jones, Lines In The Ocean: Thinking With The Sea About Territory And
International Law, 4 LONDON REv. INT'L. L. 307, 334 (2016) (discussing the striation
process of dividing up the sea under UNCLOS).
401. See Shearer, supra note 339, at 52.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 52-53.
404. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective),
UNITED NATIONS: OcFEAs & L. SEA (1998), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention-ag
reements/convention historical-perspective.htm [https://perma.cc/W79L-2TQC].
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shelf extensions, and now, the South China Sea. 40 5 These tensions are not
likely to be brought within the less than water-tight regime historically
presented by UNCLOS or the proto-liberal progenitors of the dogma of freedom of the seas.
The South China Sea Arbitration is remarkable for the degree of attention drawn to the problem of historical effectivites and the proof of China's
historic title or rights over the South China Sea. The absurdity of the claim
that China was the historic dominus over this sea puts it claim on par with
fifteen century Luso-Spanish thinking-a point clearly implied by the Tri40 6
But it
bunal's sweeping rebuke of China's reconstructed legal argument.
would be anachronistic to dismiss China's claim as such.
7
China's sense of entitlement, when not romanticized, 4 ° is also
informed by an underlying sense of inequality, inconsistency, historical
selectivity, and imperial double-dealing. 40 8 The litigation itself has been
criticized as ill-considered and insincere, particularly given the United
States' poor track record "against being artificially forced into international
4 10
adjudications," 40 9 and doubtless, its unwillingness to ratify UNCLOS.
Even within conventional regime structures, powerful and historical interests of the Pax Americana in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have
exploited vagaries within the regime structure of UNCLOS or the slowly
forming ideational expression of high seas freedoms to facilitate episodic
extensions of Gargantuan, sovereign-like proportions, first over the territorial sea, then the continental shelf, now possible extensions, the EEZ, the
possible passageways ringing the polar North, the shrinking global commons, and a host of speculative or emerging frontiers that await potential
resource extractions, for instance, Antarctica, Svalbard, the moon, outer
space, the human genome, cyberspace. 4 1 1 Conventional regimes limit the
405. See, e.g., Clive Schofield, The El Dorado Effect: Reappraising the 'Oil Factor' in
Maritime Boundary Disputes, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICTION 112 (Clive Scholfield et al. eds., 2014).
406. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, at '1 263.
407. See Robert Lawrence Kuhn, South China Sea Dispute: My Candid Conversation
with General Peng Guangqian [Deputy Secretary-General of China's National Security
Forum], CCTV.CoM (Aug. 1, 2016), http://english.cctv.com/2016/08/01/ARTIH1nhy
CBvO8ItpPscxOerl6O8Ol.shtml (quoting General Peng: "For several thousand years,
China had fought with winds and waves, pirates and invaders, in the South China Sea.
This is our family property that we have earned; it is the heritage created by our ancestors.") [https://perma.cc/BM35-EJEF].
408. See, e.g. Kristine Angeli Sabillo, PH Calls China Double-Dealing,Asks ASEAN To
Assert Leadership, INQUIRER (Apr. 26, 2015), http://globalnation.inquirer.net/121463/
[https://perma.cc/RQ6Tph-calls-china-double-dealing-asks-asean-to-assert-leadership
6E7J].
409. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Philippine Law of the Sea Action Against China: Relearning the Limits of International Adjudication, 15 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 393, 394 (2016); see
also Schoenbaum, supranote 93, at 290, 293 (noting the Tribunal's conclusions "retain a
whiff of unfairness" particularly as applied to Chinese historic fishing rights).
(June 6,
410. William Gallo, Why Hasn't the US Signed the Law of the Sea Treaty?,3 VOA,
36 342
.html
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2016), http://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sign-law-sea-treaty/
[https://perma.cc/V79H-U2HQ].
411. See, e.g., Xia Liping, Asian Security, in CRUX OF ASIA CHINA, INDIA, AND THE
EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER 124 (Tellis & Mirski ed., 2013).
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interplay between dominium and imperium with regard to many of these
frontiers, 4 12 but as the prospect for harvesting the riches of these frontiers
nears, in a geo-space marked by scarcity, so too does the syndromic temptation to appropriate and control.
Within this mix, a rising but insecure maritime China seeks to assert
its interpretation of the pliable provisions of UNCLOS to address imbalances from the colonial age, and to safeguard rapidly evolving military and
economic security interests. China seeks to except itself from the restrictions imposed on historic claims by UNCLOS. 4 13 Although a beneficiary
and strong supporter of the extension of coastal state sovereignty during
the negotiations leading up to UNCLOS, the unsettled tension between
dominium and imperium swirls in the backwater of its hegemonic mindset.
The reordering of imposed rules, even rules that in many respects benefit
China, suggests an irresistible imperial temptation. Receding in this syndromic convergence of ownership and rule is the recourse to effectivites,
which are caught in the cross-fire of competing historical narratives.
Perhaps China has overplayed its hand in the South China Sea-a mistake resulting from an intramural policy dispute between soft and hard
elements within its authoritarian leadership. 4 14 Perhaps China is angling
to implement a grand bargaining strategy, a willingness to exchange its
declaratory policy over sovereignty disputes in the South and East China
Seas for concessions involving security interests of the United States in
East Asia, especially regarding its security commitment to Taiwan. 41 5 Wild
card developments already confound predictions of how the Award will
play oUt. 4 1 6 Functional and cooperative management schemes have been
412. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; See Treaty concerning Spitsbergen, Nor.-U.S.- Den. -Fr.-It. -Jap.-Neth.-GB.-Ir.-Br overseas Dom.-Swed., Feb. 9, 1920,
https://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=282061[https://perma.cc/F4F6-DXFP];
Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5 1979,
19 I.L.M. 1434; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
610 U.N.T.S. 205.
413. Sreenivasa Rao Pemmaraju, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v.
China): Assessment of the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 15 CHiNESE J. INT. L.

265, 265 (2016).
414. China scholar David Shambaugh argues China turned away from the reformminded period launched by Deng Xiaoping and since 2008-2009 has been stagnating
relatively under the hard authoritarians, including current leader Xi Jiping. See generally
DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA'S FUTURE

(2016).

415. This idea has been put forth as a U.S. policy revision. See generally Charles L.
Glaser, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?: The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and
Accommodation, 39 INT'L SEC. 49 (2015).
416. One concern was that the Philippines would propagandize the Award to press
China to subordinate its interests, and in doing so, force the hand of the United States to
act as Manila's "security guarantor." Ted Galen Carpenter, Why the South China Sea
Verdict is Likely to Backfire, NAT'L INT. (July 13, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/
the-skeptics/why-the-south-china-sea-verdict-likely-backfire-16957
[https://perma.cc/
98KR-ALZR]. That prospect now seems far from likely. Stunning accounts have surfaced of human rights abuse and extrajudicial killing tracing to Philippine President,
Rodrigo Duterte, when he was the former Mayor of Davao City. Reports of his public
praise of extrajudicial killings of drug dealers and drug addicts have generated criticism.
See, e.g., Philippines, Human Rights Watch (June 30, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/asia/
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The Tribunal, not charged with considering the political implications
of its Award, noted it was "beyond dispute that both parties [wiere obliged
to comply. ' 4 18 But China did not comply, and the sweeping rebuke of
China's legal claims raises immediate political concerns.4 19 China's
ambassador to the United States warned the award will "intensify conflict"
philippines (last visited June 30, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7AF9-J32U]; Philippines,
Ambassador Discusses Davao Killings Report with Human Rights Watch, WiaLF xs (Mar.
2, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANILA757 a.html (summarizing U.S. Ambassador Kristie A. Kenny's meeting with Human Rights Watch Executive
Director Kenneth Roth involving reports that "Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte . . .
appear[s] to be complicit in at least permitting the vigilantism and possibly in arranging
actual killings) [https://perma.cc/TT2S-CDZG]; Pres. Duterte answers a Questionfrom a
U.K. Reporter on the Number of People being Killed, YouTUBE (Aug. 21, 2016), (taking full
responsibility for empowering the police and military to combat drug abuse), https://
[https://perma.cc/3KBQ-F9F2]. Addiwww.youtube.com/watch?v-zBMRN7CgSwM
tional accounts quote Duterte as admitting that he personally took part in extrajudicial
killings. See Philippines' Duterte Admits Personally Killing Suspects, BBCNEws (Dec. 14,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world38311655 [https://perma.cc/J7TC-8VW9].
Duterte took office on June 30, 2016, only weeks before the Tribunal's Award, but a
"rash of anti-American outbursts" have called into question the longstanding U.S.-Filipino relationship. Trefor Moss, Rodrigo Duterte's Policy Shifts Confound U.S. Allies, WALL
STEET J. (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/rodrigo-dutertes-policy-shiftsconfound-u-s-allies-1473869601 [https://perma.cc/DR6P-WBT4]. In a possibly tectonic
shift in relations, Duterte's first state visit was to China, where the countries agreed to
resume direct talks on the South China Sea dispute. See Jane Perlez, Rodrigo Duterte and
Xi JinpingAgree to Reopen South China Sea Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-xi-jinping
.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/7AAU-KYM3]. A Philippine newspaper reported the Philippines and China are negotiating a deal to jointly explore energy sources in the South
China Sea, including Reed Bank (Recto Bank), an area of major contention. See Daxim
L. Lucas, PH to Agree on Joint Oil Exploration with China in Disputed Sea, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER (Oct. 19, 2016), http://business.inquirer.net/216959/ph-to-agree-on-joint-oilexploration-with-china-in-disputed-sea?utm content=bufferb8356&utm medium=social
&utmsource=twitter.com&utm campaign=buffer [https://perma.cc/BFR5-BU6G].
Additional reports have signaled Duterte's intention to sever the Philippines' seven-decade alliance with the U.S., abrogate the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and pursue an independent foreign policy-statements that Duterte has seemingly
contradicted, thus confounding U.S. policy-makers and calling into question Duterte's
intentions. See Simon Denyer, PhilippineLeader Duterte Now Wants U.S. Troops Out 'In
the Next Two Years', WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/phihppines-duterte-now-wants-us-troops-out-in-two-years/2016/10/26/32bec8a5[https://perma.cc/A378-XYZH]; Simon
8584-4d95-8e9d-4d7762865055story.html
Denyer, Philippine President Creating Uncertainty, Causing Distress, U.S. Diplomat Says,
WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-diplomat-saysduterte-creating-uncertainty-causing-distress/2016/10/24/6702b 186-99c3-1 Ie6-b4c9391055ea9259_story.html?tid=a inl [https://perma.cc/8KSU-4QEV].
417. Bateman, supra note 171, at 201-02.
418. South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, at 1201.
419. Jane Perlez, Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (July
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2 016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hagueruling-philippines.html? r=O (quoting the Philippines' chief counsel, Paul S. Reichler, as
claiming: "It's an overwhelming victory. We won on every significant point.") [https://
perma.cc/FSD7-HSLW].
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possibly resulting in confrontation. 4 20 A former United States State
Department legal adviser wrote despite China's overbroad claims the "litigation has caused far more harm than good."'4 2 1 Principal stakeholders in
the area have tempered remarks. 42 2 A draft statement at the September
2016 Vientiane meeting of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) heads of state omitted reference to the Tribunal's Award, an omission construed as an acknowledgment of China's displeasure and military
and economic might 423 and as a gesture to help China save face. 4 24 In
opening remarks, however, United States President Barack Obama pledged
that that "the United States will continue to fly and sail and operate wherever international law allows. ' 42 5 China responded by pledging to dispel
4 26
interference in South China Sea issues.
The project of circumscribing the law of the sea within the rule-orientation of UNCLOS remains incomplete. The established norms and zones
that allow for the appropriation of the resources of the sea remain imperfectly connected to the liberal project to keep the seas free and open, as
qualified as that project has been. The liberal thalassocracy finds an illiberal challenger and the coming crisis in the South China Sea will match
overlapping insecurities and interests that seek to exploit the resources of
the sea while maintaining influence over the rules relating to that exploitation. Treaty of Tordesillas syndrome floats in the wake of the South China
420. Dean Cheng, South China Sea After the Tribunal Ruling: Where Do We Go From
Here? HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 20, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2016/7/south-china-sea-after-the-tribunal-ruling (quoting Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai) [https://perma.cc/47H2-49VJ].
421. See Sofaer, supra note 409, at 394.
422. Kerry Lynn Nankivell, South China Sea: Fishing in Troubled Waters, THE DIPLOMAT
(Aug. 18, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/south-china-sea-fishing-in-troubledwaters/ (noting the "deafening silence" among principal powers affected by the ruling)
[https://perma.cc/HQ9-2QU4].
423. See South China Sea Row Tops ASEAN Summit Agenda, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 8, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/south-china-sea-row-tops-asean-summitagenda-160908052213165.html [https://perma.cc/TG6D-7WGP].
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(Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/08/beijing-banksfractured-asean-160803082228974.html ("The silver lining to the lack of a concrete
statement on the South China Sea is that it does provide Beijing with a desperately
needed "face-saving" moment after the crushing blow delivered by the PCA") [https://
perma.cc/UUJ4-SXEA]; Stewart M. Patrick, Divert Course: Beijing Needs a Way to Save
Face in the South China Sea, DEF. ONE (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/
ideas/2016/04/divert-course-beijing-needs-way-save-face-south-china-sea/127449/
(discussing the need to devise a strategy to assist China escape its imprudent South China
Sea policy) [https://perma.cc/QPB3-J4E8].
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Sea Arbitration, requiring a broader accommodation of litigated historical
interests or an acknowledgment of the prospect of coming conflict.

